DAVID MEETS GOLIATH: CONSUMERS UNITE
AGAINST BIG BUSINESS
Leon E. Trakman*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Then join hand in hand, brave Americans all, by uniting we
stand, by dividing we fall.1
Despite the growth of consumerism, individual consumers
generally lack the resources to sue big business for their modest
losses arising daily from illegal bank charges, unjustified insurance
premiums, and product defects. Deterred by the cost of individual
suit and the likelihood of winning meagre damages, most consumers do not bother to seek individual justice. In the meantime,
banks, insurance companies, and auto manufacturers make millions of dollars in profit by breaching obligations towards masses of
their customers. Mandatory class actions can redress such default
by consolidating the claims of consumers who otherwise are unlikely to sue individually. A public interest trust can further compensate consumers and deter mass default by allocating the
defaulter's profits that are not disbursed to consumers as a class
through a trust charged with public responsibility.
Mass default of consumer transactions occurs under three
conditions: the mass defaulter has deliberately, recklessly, or ignorantly failed to advise co-contractors about an actual or impending
risk of loss arising from its own non- or malfeasance; similarly situated individuals are generally unlikely to detect that risk of loss, or
to sue on account of it; the defaulter saves or otherwise profits in
2
not having to compensate consumers fully for the ensuing harm.
* S.J.D. (Harvard).
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2 For the relationship between a "mass" and a "relational" contract, see infra note

9. For studies on restitution as a method of returning profit derived from breach to
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This article presents two seldom used responses to mass default of consumer transactions: the use of mandatory class actions
and the creation of public interest trusts. A mandatory class action
allows victims of mass default to proceed as a class, while denying
them the right to sue the defaulter individually. A public interest
trust disburses unclaimed damages among public interest organizations for consumer use. Together, a mandatory class action and a
public interest trust enable mass victims to receive compensation
not ordinarily available to them through individual suit, while impeding the defaulter from profiting from mass default.
A class action for mass default is premised upon a communitarian relationship among victims that arises out of the common
treatment of victims, their comparable losses, their shared interest
in redressing those losses, and the public's interest in deterring
mass default.3 Victims have an interest in securing compensation
and the public has an interest in deterring mass default. Parties
ordinarily express these communal sentiments through public discussion, by complaining to consumer protection agencies, by boycotting the defaulter's products and services, and by grieving labor
contracts. I argue that aggrieved consumers are also justified in
acting communally through a mandatory class action 4 that justifies
the cost of doing so.5 In supporting this communitarian response
LEGAL PROBS. 141 (1983); Henry Mather, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract,
92 YALE L.J. 14 (1982).
3 See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 563,
600 (1983) (discussing the solidarity rights of mass victims of breach). Unger describes "solidarity rights" as "the legal entitlements of communal life." Id.; see alsoJay
M. Feinman, CriticalApproaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REv. 829, 840-42 (1983);

Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discovery of Solidarity and Power in Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 565, 576 (1985).

4 See infra § IV (discussion mandatory class actions). On support for a communitarian approach towards mass consumer litigation, see Jack B. Weinstein, EthicalDilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469, 485 (1994). The need to render
individual rights compatible with community interests is.implicit in modem "communitarian" scholarship. See WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES,
AND DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1992); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLImCAL DISCOURSE (1991); ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE,WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989); DEMOCRACY AND THE WELFARE STATE (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1988); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, in
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 519 (1992).
5 Some contend that imposing mass liability upon large-scale producers adds to
litigation costs, increases the price of goods and services, and reduces their quality.

See, e.g., David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing PunitiveDamages Against Manufacturersof
Defective Products, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1982); Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Effi-

ciency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S.C. L. REV. 1, 43-53 (1982);James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers' Liabilityfor Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform,
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to mass default in consumer transactions, I argue that individual
suits do not adequately redress the harm arising from mass default
in consumer transactions. The experience of mass default challenges the libertarian assumption that the "common good" derives
from the solitary acts of self-motivated private litigants.6
In presenting these alternatives, I concentrate on mass breach
of consumer contracts giving rise to property damage,7 as distinct
from cases of tort liability for personal injuries.' The analysis, however, applies generally to mass default of discrete transactions, 9 in56 N.C. L. REv. 625, 626 (1978). These arguments are spurious. Mass default multiplies the cost of litigation. It raises the price of goods and services. It gives rise to
defective goods and services.
6 The classical assumptions underlying the private litigation model are evident in
the law of contract: contract law is a private regime, it is founded upon the classical
liberal principle of laissezfaire,this principle is both morally and logically necessary to
the symmetrical and harmonious development of the common law, and without it,
the common law would fail. See I WILLIAM HERBERT PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 19
(1905), commenting on Langdell, the founder of this classical approach (C. Langdell,
A Summay of the Law of Contracts, in CASES ON CONTRACrS 89 (2d ed. 1880)). The
falsehood underlying these assumptions was clearly recognized by the neoclassical realist school. See GRANT GILMORE,THE

DEATH OF

CONTRACT (1974); Calvin Woodard,

The Limits of Legal Realism: An HistoricalPerspective,54 VA. L. REv. 689 (1968); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370 (1960). It is also reflected in the recognition of relational contracts. See also Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of LongTerm Economic Relations Under Classical,Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw.
U. L. REV. 854 (1978); Harvey Rochman, Due Process: Accuracy or Opportunity, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2705, 2710 (1992).
7 See supra note 2.
8 The rationale is that a mandatory class action is an appropriate means by which
to redress the interests of mass consumers who have each suffered limited property
damage. It is inappropriate, however, in redressing liability for personal injuries or
death arising in tort. See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa.
1993). In General Motors Corp., the court stipulated that the settlement concluded
between General Motors and the class claiming damages for defects in the G.M. P/U
Truck did not encompass any claims for personal injury or death. Id. at 333. See infra
note 22 for further discussion of the G.M. settlement. On the distinction between
liability in contract and tort, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS, § 469-70 (5th ed. 1984); WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS, 456-58 (7th ed. 1982).
9 This approach develops a distinction already adopted by Ian Macneil. Macneil
distinguishes discrete transactions between the same parties from ongoing relationships called "relational contracts." I consider discrete transactions that include a different element of "relationalism." That "relationalism" occurs when one contractor
concludes and breaches a mass of similar contracts, when it anticipates having to compensate only some of the parties within that mass, and when it expects to save as a
result of under-compensating or not compensating that mass in general. In this
sense, the mass contract is "relational," in the "related" treatment accorded mass victims, in the "related" suffering of those who are subject to mass default, and in the
.related" profits that the mass defaulter makes from each "related" breach. See generally MacNeil, supra note 6; Ian R. MacNeil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky,
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cluding tort actions." The alternatives presented build upon
existing developments in law; they require no statutory amendment, no departure from stare decisis, and no constitutional challenge. Mandatory class suits, in combination with the creation of
public trusts, merely broaden the application of mass civil suit by
providing an effective means of redressing mass default that until
now has eluded legal redress.
II.

AN ILLUSTRATION

Businesses repeatedly subject consumers to mass breach of
contract, unreasonable bank surcharges,1 1 the deprivation of guaranteed health and welfare benefits, 12 violations of product warranties," and excessive finance charges. 4 Recognizing their victim's
failure or reluctance to sue, mass defaulters sometimes breach with
impunity. They compensate only aggressive customers and ignore
or intimidate the remainder into submission. Often ignorant
about the persistent nature of mass default, most consumers fail to
protest their ill-treatment. Thus, defaulters not only benefit from
the breach, but the inability of consumers to launch a legal challenge fails to deter future breaches.
A settlement arrived at between the Wells Fargo Bank and its
customers in 1988 exemplifies the risk that both private litigation
and voluntary consumer class actions might allow the defaulter to
retain huge profits at the expense of mass consumers. In a California-wide voluntary class action, 15 the customers of Wells Fargo
Bank complained, inter alia, that the bank had charged them an
unjustified surcharge for checks returned due to insufficient funds.
In the settlement agreement filed on April 13, 1987,16 experts for
the claimants estimated that a partial refund of the surcharge was
68 VA. L. REv. 947 (1982); Ian R. MacNeil, Power, Contractand the Economic Mode4 14J.
ECON. IssuEs 909 (1980). On solidarity rights, see Unger, supra note 3, at 600.
10 On the need to avoid narrow classifications (including the distinction between

contract and tort) in cases of mass default that threaten to produce public harm, see,
e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
11 For example, a dispute arose between Wells Fargo Bank and its customers arising out of the Bank's requirement that customers pay an illegal surcharge for checks
returned for insufficient funds. See infra note 16 for further discussion of the Wells
Fargo Bank dispute.

12 See, e.g., Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
13 See, e.g., In re General Motors. Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
14 See, e.g., Durrett v. John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Tex., 1993).
15 Report of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Re: Settlement Implementation, No. 720307,
2-3 (S.F. Super. Ct., Oct. 13, 1988) (hereinafter WELLs FARGO BANK REPORT).
16 Agreement for Settlement of Certain Class Actions Against Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. and Crocker National Bank, No. 720307 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 13, 1987).
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reasonably valued at between $6,814,399 and $13,628,799. The experts estimated further that between 40% and 80% percent of eligible class members, specifically between 62,916 and 125,831
persons, would make a claim. In fact, 5% or 8,901 persons actually
submitted claims and only half of them received compensation in
whole or in part. Wells Fargo Bank paid out $481,316.69, well below the $6.5 to $13.5 million of its estimated liability. As a result,
the settlement rewarded less than 3% of customers eligible1 7for refunds and Wells Fargo retained the excess not distributed.
This case illustrates the failure of both the private litigation
model and the voluntary class action to adequately redress the
harm arising from mass default of consumer contracts. First, a
bank like Wells Fargo gains financially by retaining the surcharges
that were not paid to the under-represented class. An organization
like General Motors benefits when a settlement allows it to "pay"
for its mass default by supplying $1,000 coupons to a fraction of
injured customers to be used to offset the purchase price of further
G.M. products."8 Second, more aggressive customers sometimes
are able to reach a private settlement, contrary to the interests of
the class and conceivably, the bank itself. 9 Third, settlements in
cases like the Wells Fargo dispute often favor the defendant. For
example, only a fraction of prospective claimants ultimately participated in the settlement with Wells Fargo. Indeed, a mere 3% of
the 5% who filed claims succeeded, and each received a paltry
$108.31.20 Finally, the settlements sometimes bypass the public interest; for instance, the Wells Fargo settlement established no
mechanism to redress the general harm that arose from Wells
Fargo's default; nor do such settlements likely deter financial insti-

Id. at 3-4.
See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
19 See infra notes 97-100 (discussing the shortcomings of voluntary class actions).
20 A similar situation occurred in State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715 P.2d 564, 571
(1986). In that case, a class of almost 7,000,000 consumers provided a maximum
recovery of $2.00 for each class member. Understandably, only 14% to 33% of the
eligible members of the class actually applied for refunds for clothing price
overcharges. Levi Strauss & Co. clearly profited from the small number of claimants.
On the requirement that each claimant file a claim in accordance with a claims
formula, see I HERBERT NEWBERG ON CLAss ACTIONS, § 12.35 at 570 (1977). Newberg
confirms, inter alia, that the more complex the requirements for filing the claim, the
smaller the number of claims actually made. Id. at § 8.40, at 178; see also In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 659 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 936 (1982); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 557 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ill.
1983), aff'd. in part, revd. in part, 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1113 (1985). See generally MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985).
17
18
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tutions from engaging in similar conduct in the future.2 1
The Wells Fargo case is far from an isolated example of
problems that arise with mass default settlements. The conspicuous settlement between General Motors and purchasers of its defective P/U Truck illustrates the extent to which a mass defaulter
can settle with a class of claimants and still profit from mass default.22 There, those proposing the settlement estimated that only
between 34% and 38% of the 5 million potential claimants would
join the class of claimants. General Motors would settle for $2.024
billion out of a possible $5 billion liability, thus saving $2.976 billion. The probability is that claimants would have actually received
Bank,
a far lesser sum, while General Motors, like Wells Fargo
23
would have profited handsomely from its mass default.
III.

PUBLIC HARM

The case for imposing liability for fault in the public interest is
especially cogent in mass consumer transactions for several reasons. The defaulter occupies a position of market dominance. It
ordinarily avoids disclosing defects in the quality of its goods and
services. It realizes that most consumers are unlikely to sue it successfully. Most are intimidated by the prospect of having to pay
exorbitant attorney and court costs. Many fear that, even if they
are successful, their damages will fail to offset the costs of litigation.
Still others worry about taking on such a powerful opponent.
Instances of mass default are all too evident in consumer practice. Banks add surcharges to the daily transactions of their customers in the interests of accumulating profit in breach of
21 See infra note 153 (describing the ability of a settlement to deter future mass

defaults).
22 See In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1993). In that case,
the class action litigants owned 1973 to 1988 model year General Motors C/K full size
pickup trucks and 1987 to 1991 General Motors R/V pickup trucks. Each of these

models had fuel tanks located outside the frame rails. Plaintiffs alleged that this construction represented defective design due to the increased danger of a post collision
fire.
The complaint as consolidated and amended alleged that General Motors had
violated both federal and state law claims and should be liable for fraud, unfair trade
practice and breach of contract. The class sought compensatory damages and punitive damages for economic losses, and injunctive relief. The class's claims excluded any
recovery for personal injury and wrongful death. See generallyJohn M. Van Dyke &
Jamie A. Louie, A Consumer Products Liability Class Action Remedy for Inherently Defective
Products, 19 W. ST. U. L. REv. 119 (1991) (describing consumer class actions brought
in products liability cases).
23 See In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
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contract.2 4 Large-scale employers reduce the pay of their employees below minimum wage 25 or renege on early retirement packages 26 to reduce corporate costs. Insurance companies consistently
underpay valid insurance claims to horde the difference between
the amount due to each insured and the amount actually paid.2 7
The intent of such mal- or nonfeasance is unmistakable. The mass
defaulter, a General Motors28 or aJohn Deere, 29 exploits the inability or unwillingness of most consumers to redress mass abuse by
private civil suit. The result is equally clear. The mass defaulter
saves or profits from such default. The victims, in contrast, bear
the cumulative burden of the mass defaulter's failure to fulfill its
fiduciary obligations towards them.
Despite the failure of the defaulter to advise mass customers
about the presence of defects in its performance, lawyers all too
often pay lipservice to the concept of the faultless breach. They
base liability simply upon the existence of a series of discrete
breaches of contract, regardless of the mal- or nonfeasance of the
defaulter. They insist that fault does not arise in contract, however
manifest its harmful social effects. They pass over the cumulative
profit which the defaulter earns in consequence of its mass breach;
and they ignore the extent to which the concept of faultless breach
encourages defaulters to breach with impunity."0
24 See generally WELLS FARGO BANK REPORT, supra note 15.
25 Leo L. Lam, Comment, DesignerDuty: Extending Liability To Manufacturers For
Violations of Standardsin Garment Industry Sweatshops, 141 U. PA. L. Rv. 623, 633 (1992)

(footnote omitted).
26 See, e.g., Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
27 See Fletcher v. Western National Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 95 (App. Ct.
1970) (stating that "[a]n insurer has a special relationship to its insured and has special implied-in-law duties towards the insured.") (citation omitted). On the responsibility of public service companies to the public at large, see Charles K. Burdick, The
Origin of the PeculiarDuties of Public Service Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REv. 514 (1911);
Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARV.
L. REv. 156 (1904). See generally The New Public Law: A Symposium, 89 MICH. L. Rv.
797 (1991); Leon E. Trakman, Adhesion Contracts and the Law of Insurance, 13 MANITOBA L.J. 23 (1983). See also David S. Miller, Insurance as Contract: The Argument For
Abandoning The Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1849 (1988).
28 See In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
29 See Durrett v. John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
30 "[T] he wicked contract-breaker," Grant Gilmore once observed, "should pay no

more in damages than the innocent and pure in heart." GimoRE, supra note 6, at 1415. Gilmore reflected further: "Money damages for breach of contract were to be
Icompensatory' never punitive; the contract-breaker's motivation, Holmes explained,
makes no legal difference whatever .. . ." Id. at 14 (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rv. 457, 462 (1897)); see also E.A. FARNswoRTH, CONTRACTS, §§ 12.1, 12.8 at 874-75 (2d ed. 1990). See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS, § 92 at 613-14 (4th ed. 1971); Mark Pennington, PunitiveDamages
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Yet, responsibility for fault is inherent in the common law of
contract." It falls under the rubric of breach of fiduciary obligation in contract,3 2 it takes the form of an abuse of standards of
decency and fair play, 3 and it grounds the contractual practices of
quasi-public institutions like banks in responsibilities owed to consumers at large. 4 Courts embrace these concepts of fault to hold
for Breach of Contract: A Core Sample from the Decisions of the Last Ten Years, 42 ARK. L.
REv. 31 (1989). For a philosophical critique of these assumptions, see C.B. Macpherson, The Rise and Fallof Economic Justice, in THE RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMICJusTICE 17
(1985).
31 For example, fault can be a threshold inquiry in determining the presence of an
estoppel flowing out of a reliance interest. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance
Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools'Doors, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 247 (1991); Robert E. Goodin, Theories of Compensation, 9 OxFoRDJ. LEGAL STUD. 56 (1989); Todd D.
Rakoff, Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest as a Work of Legal Scholarship, 1991
Wis. L. REv. 203 (1991); W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in ContractDamages, 76
CORNELL L. REv. 197 (1990); Jim Leitzel, Reliance and Contract Breach, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 87 (1989); Richard Craswell, Performance, Reliance, and One-sided Information, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1989); see also Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability:
ConsequentialDamages in the Law of Contract, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989); Stephen J.
Ware, Comment, Critique of the ReasonableExpectationsDoctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1461
(1989); Orvill C. Snyder, PromissoryEstoppel as Tort, 35 IowA L. REv. 28 (1949); Stanley
D. Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343
(1969).
32 On the development of fiduciary obligations in inter alia, the law of insurance,
see generally Mary Ann Murphy, Comment, The Emerging Fiduciay Obligations and
Strict Liability in InsuranceLaw, 14 CAL. W. L. REv. 358 (1978); Del Stiltner, Note, ExtraContractualDamages in Suits on InsurancePolicies, 46 U. CIN. L. Rv. 170 (1977); Donald
G. Beattie, Note, First Party Torts - Extra-ContractualLiability of Insurers Who Violate the
Duty of Good Faith and FairDealing, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 900 (1976); Phyllis Savage, Note,
The Availability of Excess Damagesfor Wrongful Refusal to HonorFirstParty Insurance Claims
- An Emerging Trend, 45 FoRDHAM L. REv. 164 (1976). For cases which embody these
special fiduciary duties, see Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Broadway Arms Corp., 664
S.W.2d 463 (Ark. 1984); Employers Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 665 S.W.2d 873
(Ark. 1984); Ray Dodge, Inc. v. Mocre, 479 S.W.2d 518 (Ark. 1972).
33 For a debate on these standards of decency and fair play, see Linda Curtis, Note,
Damage Measurements To Bad Faith Breach of Contract: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 161 (1986); Sandra Chutorian, Note, Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: The Expansion of Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing into the
Commercial Realm, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (1986); StevenJ. Burton, Breach of Contract
and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,94 I-Rv. L. REv. 369 (1980); Russell
A. Eisenberg, Good Faith Under the Uniform Commercial Code - A New Look at an Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1971); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract
Law and the Sales Provisionsof the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968); E.
Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 666 (1963).
34 See Brown v. South Carolina Ins. Co., 324 S.E.2d 641, 644-45 (S.C. Ct. App.
1984); Milcarek v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 190 N.J. Super. 358, 364, 463 A.2d 950, 954
(App. Div. 1983); Sandler v. Lawn-A-Mat Chem. & Equip. Corp., 141 N.J. Super. 436,
449, 358 A.2d 805, 812 (App. Div. 1976), certif denied, 71 N.J. 503, 366 A.2d 658
(1976).
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insurance companies liable for a "pattern of unfair practices, '"" including "nefarious scheme [s] to mislead and defraud thousands of
policyholders.

36

They invoke fault to hold employers liable for re-

peatedly bullying employees into accepting reduced severance
pays7 or for reneging on an agreed early retirement package. 38 On
the same grounds, courts could hold banks like Wells Fargo liable
for consistently breaching its obligations towards customers who
are unable to redress the cumulative effect of mass default.
Courts impute fault to various types of mass defaulters. They
hold insurance companies liable for misrepresenting insurance
risks,3" motor vehicle companies liable for not recalling and repair35 Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 647 P.2d 86, 89 (Cal. 1982).
36 Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 155.Cal. Rptr. 843, 857 (1979); see also Ferraro
v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 87 Cal. Rptr. 226, 234 (1970). Williston attributed this expanded
duty of insurance companies in part to the increasing tendency of the public to look
upon the insurance policy not as a contract but as a special form of chattel. F.S.
WILLISTON, WILLITON ON CONTRACTS 34 (3d ed. 1957). See Moore v. American
United Life Ins. Co., 197 Cal. Rptr. 878, 895 (Ct. App. 1984); Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991); Eccobay Sportswear v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co.,
585 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 987
(Cal. 1978); see also Richard B. Graves III, Comment, Bad-Faith Denial of Insurance
Claims: Whose Faith, Whose Punishment? An Examination of Punitive Damages and Vicarious Liability, 65 TUL. L. REv. 395, 402 (1990); Theresa Viani Agee, Comment, Breach of
an Insurer's Good FaithDuty to its Insured: Tort or Contract?, 1988 UTAH L. REv. 135, 142
(1988). See generally F.A. KHAvARI, DOCTORS, LAWYERS, HOSPITALS, AND INSURANCE
COMPANIES: WHAT'S WRONG, AND WHAT TO Do ABoUT IT (1990); Leon E. Trakman,
The UnharnessedInsurer: A ForebodingPresence, 31 U. TORONTO L.J. 318 (1981); Leon E.
Trakman, Mysteries Surrounding Material Disclosure in Insurance Law, 34 U. TORONTO
L.J. 421 (1984).
37 However readily courts recognize a special public relationship between insurance companies and their customers, they fail to do so in employment-at-will relationships. For example, they indicate that they "are not convinced that a 'special
relationship' analogous to that between insurer and insured should be deemed to
exist in the usual employment relationship ...." Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 395 (Cal. 1988). In Foley, the Supreme Court of California refused to apply
dictum from Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., which suggested
that relationships similar to that between insurer and insured may apply to other contexts where a special relationship exists, to an employer's discharge of an employee
under an at-will employment. Foley, 765 P.2d at 392 (citing Seaman's Direct Buying
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158, 1166 (Cal. 1984)). One wonders why
the Foley Court was so emphatic in distinguishing employment from insurance contracts. Clearly, employment-at-will exposes the employee to risks that are comparable
to those endured by the average insured. In particular, the employee is subject to an
at-will arrangement effected by and in the interests of the employer. Perhaps the real
difference lies in the reluctance of courts to impose special obligations upon employers for fear of intruding upon the employment relationship in particular.
38 See, e.g., Sprague v. General Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich 1994).
39 See, e.g., Meirthew v. Last, 135 N.W.2d 353, 355 (1965); Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas.
Co., 53 N.J. 313, 328, 250 A.2d 580, 588 (1969). Courts similarly hold insurance companies liable for misrepresentations by insurers or their agents. See Stark v. Equitable
Life Assur. Society, 285 N.W. 466, 469 (1939) (citation omitted); Peterson v. Great
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ing defective vehicles,4" and employers liable for not advising employees about their rights.41 Courts contemplate holding megacompanies like General Motors liable for failing to disclose prior
knowledge about motor vehicle defects, 42 design flaws,4 3 or tire
defects.44

Judges have refused to allow the formal rules of privity to hamper customers seeking to mount class actions against a mass defaulter that threatens public harm.4" They have interpreted mass
contracts against the defaulter, 46 requiring it to assume special fiduciary obligations towards its customers47 and through them, toAm. Ins. Co., 52 N.W.2d 479, 482 (1952); Bowers v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 108 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1937).
40 On the implied duty to warn that is imposed upon dominant parties, see James
B. Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instructfor Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 521 (1982); Richard E. Shandell, Failureto Warn, A Drug Manufacturer'sLiability, 14
TRiAL L.Q. 5 (1982);James A.Jardine, Note, 4 HAMLINE L. Rv. 351, 360 (1981). But
cf Jordan H. Leibman, The Manufacturer'sResponsibility to Warn Product Users of Unknowable Dangers, 21 AM. Bus. L.J. 403, 432 (1984); William R. Murray, Jr., Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically UndiscoverableProductDefects, 71 GEO. L.J. 1635
(1983).
41 See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Jay M. Feinman,
The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 Asuz. L. REv. 733 (1991);
Elletta Sangerey Callahan, Employment at Will: The Relationship Between Societal Expectations and the Law, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 455 (1990); Joseph Posner, Yes, There Is Life After
Foley, 18 Sw. U. L. REv. 357 (1989); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404,
1421-27 (1967); Mark L. Martin, Comment, Wrongful Discharge of Employees Terminable
at Will - A New Theory of Liability in Arkansas, 34 ARx L. REv. 729 (1981); Laila Boberg
Soares, Comment, Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co.: Wrongul Discharge, A New Tort to
Protect At-Will Employees, 8 W. ST. U. L. REv. 91 (1980). See generally, Andrew Phang,
Note, Termination of Employment Contracts and Taking Advantage of One's Wrong, 20 INDUS. L.J. 214 (1991).
42

Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65 N.J. 581, 326 A.2d 673 (1974).

43 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
44 Shramek v. General Motors Corp., 216 N.E. 244, 247 (1966).
45 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. at 336; Durrett v.John Deere Co.,
150 F.R.D. 555, 563 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
46 On the judicial resort to the contraproferentum rule, see, e.g., Sprague v. General
Motors Corp., 843 F. Supp. 266, 307 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (citations omitted), which
explains that the rule of contra proferentum requires courts to construe ambiguities in
employee benefit plans in the employees' favor.
47 In an adhesive relationship, lawyers for the dominant party usually draft a standardized contract in its favor to which the other party is required to "adhere." For
classical commentary, see Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 633-34 (1943); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 1072 (1943); Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARv. L. REv. 198 (1919); Nathan Isaacs,
The Standardizingof Contracts, 27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); HAROLD C. HAVINGHURST, THE
NATURE OF PRIVATE COTRACr (1961); Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract: An Essay

in Perspective,40 YALE L.J. 704, 751 (1931). Frederick Kessler highlighted the adhesive
nature of unbargained agreements in which one party-an employer, an insurance
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wards society at large.48 As the court stated in Jones v. Abriani:49
[i]t is hard to imagine where the public interest .

.

. is more

important than in consumer matters, especially where the consumer is in an inferior bargaining position and forced to either
sign an adhesion contract or do without the item desired.5"
In summation, courts render default into a public responsibility. 5 ' They preserve good faith dealings in mass contracts by holdcompany, a public carrier, a utility or manufacturer-dictated the terms to which the
other "adhered." An adhesion contract, by itself, merely defines the nature of the
contractual relationship: one party to the contract dictates the terms, the other "adheres" to those terms. However, the relationship created by such an adhesion contract does give rise to legal consequences when the adhering party lacks "meaningful
choice." In that case, the contract may be construed as unconscionable. See Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See generally
Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer
Form Contracts,47 U. MiAmi L. REV. 1263 (1993) (proposing a solution to problems
associated with form contracts).
48 On mass consumer contracts that are adhesive in nature, see, e.g., Burris v. First
Financial Corp., 928 F.2d 797 (8th Cir., 1991). See also Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 223 A.2d 8 (1966); Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 250 S.W.2d 785, 790
(1952); Kerry L. Macintosh, Gilmore Spoke Too Soon: ContractRises From the Ashes of the
Bad Faith Tort, 27 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 483, 502 (1994); Forrest Booth and Lynn Haggerty
King, "Bad Faith" - Legal Trends in Suits Against Insurers, 4 U.S.F. MAR. L. REV. 1, 9
(1992); Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract?- Inductions From a
Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-PartyInsurance Contract,65 CORNELL L. REV. 330,
349 (1980); Murphy, supra note 32; Donlad A. Orlovsky, Torts, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv.
1259 (1978); John G. Holinka, Note, Damages for Mental Suffering Caused by Insurers:
Recent Developments in the Law of Tort and Contract, 48 NoTRE DAME LAW. 1303, 1303
(1973); Arthur Allen Leff, Injury, Ignoranceand Spite - The Dynamics of Coercive Collection,
80 YALE L.J. 1 (1970). See generally Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 797 (1983) (exploring the relationship
between product age and manufacturer liability).
49 350 N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976).
50 Id. at 650; see also Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 535, 279 A.2d 640, 647 (1971);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969). The belief that contract law regulates discrete transactions between consenting parties, not social relationships beyond
them, has long been attacked as unrealistic in a world that is dominated by standardized or boiler-plated agreements phrased in the most convoluted and complex of
terms. See, e.g., Macneil, Power, Contractand the Economic Mode, supra note 9. For classical commentary to similar effect, see also Kessler, supra note 47; Edwin W. Patterson,
Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Bal4 43 COLUM. L. REv. 731 (1943). But see WOLFGANG GASTON FRIEDMAN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIEMY, 91-94 (1959); STEWART MACAULAY, THE LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER:
THEIR DEALERs 23-26, 78-80 (1966).

THE AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS AND

51 For evidence of the extent to which big business knows of the risks of harm to
their employees and customers, see In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330, 335
(E.D. Pa. 1993) and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So. 2d 991,
995 (Ala. 1981). On the culling of such evidence from the defendant's own records,
see Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361-62 n.2 (1981); Rimer v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 641 F.2d 450, 455 (6th Cir. 1981); MOIRAJOHNSTON, THE LAs-r
NINE MINuTEs: THE STORY OF FLIGHT 981 234-37 (1976). See also Kathleen M. Doyle,
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ing defaulters accountable for bad faith breach5 2 and impose
public obligations upon them for violating their fiduciary obligation towards consumers at large.5" They create de facto public
trusts by disbursing total savings or profits arising from mass
breach to multiple claimants, and sometimes, by passing the residue on to public interest organizations.5 4
IV.

MANDATORY CLAss ACTION

This section argues for extended use of the class action in
mass default cases and for greater resort to the mandatory class
action in consumer transactions. The purpose is twofold: to
demonstrate that class actions are vastly preferable to individual
suit in consumer transactions, and that the mandatory class action
is far fairer to the parties and more beneficial to the public interest
than a voluntary class action. The conventional private litigation
model assumes that all individuals have the inherent right to sue
privately. Individuals are free to choose whether, when, and how
to proceed, including the right to select a legal counsel, to decide
upon the nature of the action or defense, and to proceed without
intervention by others. Three assumptions underlie this model:
that the freedom of individuals to settle their differences through
separate suits promotes a democratic society, that this freedom inheres in liberty itself, and that it facilitates both justice and effiSurvey, Relevance of Industry Custom in Strict Product Liability, 60 WASH. L. REv. 195
(1984).
52 On liability for bad faith breach of contract, see generally Marvin F. Milich, The
Evolution of the Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Contract Trends and Future Trepidation, 94 COM. L.J. 418 (1989); Linda Curtis, Note, Damage Measurementsfor Bad Faith
Breach of Contracts: An Economic Analysis, 39 STAN. L. REv. 161 (1986). See also Sidney
W. Delong, The Efficiency of a Disgorgement as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 22 IND. L.
REv. 737 (1989); Saul Levmore, ProbabilisticRecoveries, Restitution, and Recurring Wrongs,
19J. LEGAL STUD. 691 (1990).
53 Liability for mass default resembles, but is not identical to, liability for the

breach of an adhesive relationship. An adhesive relationship arises when a dominant
party, like a bank, imposes terms of a contract that it devises upon another party, the
customer, while the other party adheres to those terms. In both mass default and
adhesion contracts, the dominant party engages in a relationship of unequal bargaining between it and others. Trained and skilled in contracting, it is able to breach in
relation to a mass of others who are commonly disadvantaged by a lack of technical,
economic, and legal sophistication. The bank is able to breach simply because most
customers are unsophisticated in matters of banking practice and are trusting of
banks. They seldom read the fine print in contracting with "reputable" banks. Those
who do read fine print seldom fully understand; and banks can buy off trouble-maker
customers with favorable settlements. On such adhesive relationships, see supranotes
32 and 47.
54 See infra notes 13740 and 222-26 and accompanying text.

1994]

CONSUMERS UNITE AGAINST BIG BUSINESS

629

ciency. 55 However, each assumption is overstated. The individual's
right to sue privately does not invariably promote the interests of a
democratic society. Individuals who cannot afford to sue privately
lack true liberty. Moreover, mass defaulters who default without
regard to the well-being of the individual victim defeat the ends of
a liberal democracy. In pursuing their own ends at a high social
cost, they ignore the interests of the largely oblique individual.5 6
In the context of consumer transactions, the private litigation
model often proves inadequate. It provides ineffective remedies
for those who are deterred by the cost of suit and the prospect of
receiving limited damages. It also gives the defaulter the incentive
to default en masse. The defaulter well appreciates that only a
small percentage of consumers are likely to sue on an individual
basis. 57 As a result, the defaulter usually benefits from the use of
the private litigation model. It declines to compensate consumers
who are unaware of their losses and undercompensates other consumers who are aware of the default but cannot afford to bring
suit. 58 Illustrating these propositions in personal injury cases, a survey conducted by the Department of Transportation demonstrates
that claimants receive payment for only 20% of total losses arising
from fatal motor vehicle accidents.5 9 Similarly, a study of claims in
55 On the source of democratic rights in natural law thought, see JOEL FEINBERG,
RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 130 (1979). See also H.L.A. Hart, Are
There Any NaturalRights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 179 (1955). On rights as privileges or empowerments, falling short of natural or inherent rights, see Lawrence Kohlberg, Education
for Justice: A Modem Statement of the Platonic View, in MORAL EDUCATION 57, 69 (1970).
56 See, e.g., Henry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The ContemporaryFunction of the
Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1940).
57 These apparent failings of private litigation are further evidenced in the manner in which large-scale defaulters effectively whittle down each plaintiffs claim
through the use of financial, personal and legal pressure.
58 Individuals who freely choose to sue privately ordinarily anticipate receiving a
significant award at an affordable cost. This is especially so when individuals remove
themselves from a class action because they anticipate making more by suing individually than through the class. See, e.g., AM. LAw. INST., PRELIMINARY STUDY OF COMPLEX
LITIGATION 5 (Report March 31, 1987); see also Frank I. Michelman, Forward: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986). On collateral estoppel, see, e.g., Parklane
Hoisery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Bernhard v. Bank of Am., 122 P.2d 892
(Cal. 1942); William Sam Byassee, Note, CollateralEstoppel Without Mutuality: Accepting
the Bernhard Doctrine, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1423 (1982); BryanJ. Maedgen & Sheree Lynn
McCall, Current Problems, Tools and Theories in Multiparty Products Liability Claims, 18
FORUM 117 (1982); Gray, Comment, CollateralEstoppel: One Full and FairOpportunity to
Litigate Common Facts, 39 J. Mo. B. 405 (1983). But cf Andrew C. Rose, Comment,
FederalMass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 AIB. L. REV. 1180
(1983).
59 See DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENT INJURIES 38 (1970).
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aviation disaster cases reveals that claimants ordinarily receive only
26% of the full economic loss. °
In short, companies profit from mass default under the private
litigation model whenever a sizable number of prospective claimants fail to sue or accept only partial compensation for their losses.
So long as the defaulter's profits arising from mass default exceed
its costs, it is likely to continue defaulting en masse. As the California Supreme Court once noted, in the absence of a class action
"[d]efendants may be permitted to retain ill-gotten gains simply
because their conduct harmed large numbers of people in small
61
amounts instead of small numbers of people in large amounts."
Class actions have a number of advantages over individual
suits. They reduce each class member's cost, inconvenience, and
stress in bringing a class action.6 2 No individual need sustain all
attorney's fees and court costs. Rather, each member of the class
need bear only proportionate responsibility for the cost and conduct of the action. No one need endure work disruption during
the course of suit or be dissuaded from suing by an often intimidating defaulter. As Kalven and Rosenfield emphasized in 1941, class
actions vindicate both society's interests in efficiency and the equitable interests of individual claimants. 63 Mass actions are socially efficient because they recompense a mass of worthy claimants whom
the state otherwise might have to subsidize or support, and because
64
they can avoid bankrupting an otherwise productive defaulter.
Class actions can ensure that the result is "fair and adequate to all
See ELIZABETH M. KING &JAMES P. SMITH, ECONOMIC LOSS AND COMPENSATION IN
55-58 (1988).
to which a mass defaulter is able to accumulate huge profits by
withholding payment to a large number of consumers, see, e.g., State v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 715 P.2d 564, 571 (Cal. 1986).
62 For debate on the virtues and deficiency of the class action, see generally Arthur
R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class
Action Problem,"92 HARv.L. REv. 664 (1979); William Simon, Class Actions - Useful Tool
or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375 (1972); Mark W. Friedman, Note, Constrained
Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring Class Members to Make a Good Cause Showing
Before Opting Out of a Federal Class Action, 100 YALE L.J. 745 (1990);Jon Koslow, Note,
Estimating Aggregate Damages in Class-Action Litigation under Rule lOb-5 for Purposes of
Settlement, 59 FoRDrHAm L. REv. 811, 826-30 (1991); William J. Landers & B. Wayne
Vance, Comment, Federal and State Class Actions: Developments and Opportunities, 46
Miss. L.J. 39 (1975); Note, State Class Action Statutes: A ComparativeAnalysis, 60 IowA L.
REv. 93 (1974).
63 Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 56, at 691.
64 See generally David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing IndividualJustice
by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 565 (1987); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "PublicLaw" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HAgv.L. REv.
849, 900-05 (1984).
60

AVIATION ACCIDENTS
61 On the extent
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concerned," 65 that the defaulter does not retain "illegal profit" at
the expense of mass victims,6 6 and that the action does not bankrupt the defaulter.6 7 They can avoid duplicating individual actions
that waste both public and private resources.68 Class actions also
can provide a remedy that takes account of the cumulative effect of
mass default 69 or offer a viable remedy in cases of complex litigation. 7' The case for a consumer
class action is aptly summarized in
71
Durrett v. John Deere Co.,
that one who has incurred de minimis damages might otherwise
go unrecompensed because the economics of litigation militated against bringing suit, but instead could band together with
others similarly situated and corporately seek redress because
the en masse nature 72of the class overcomes the countervailing
economic concerns.
The right of consumers to bring a voluntary class action is well
established in civil litigation and is protected by legislation.7 3 Rule
65 Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912
(1971).
66 Liebman v. J.W. Peterson Coal & Oil Co., 73 F.R.D. 531, 536 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
67 The best examples of such bankruptcies are the Johns-Manville and Dalkon
Shield cases. See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re
A.H. Robins Co., 63 B.R. 986 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986), affd sub nom. Grady v. A.H.
Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. dismissed sub nom.Joynes v. A.H. Robins,
487 U.S. 1260 (1988); see also Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust,
53 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 79, 101 (1990); Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos
Claims: The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, 53 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 27

(1990).
68 See generally Christopher H. Schroeder, CorrectiveJustice and Liabilityfor Increasing
Risks, 37 UCLA L. REv. 439 (1990);Jon 0. Newman, RethinkingFairness: Perspectiveson
the Litigation Process, 94 YALE LJ. 1649 (1985); Robert G. Bone, Personaland Impersonal
Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. Rv.
213 (1990).
69 On corrective justice in relation to class actions, see generally Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 69 (1989); MARK A.
PETERSON & MOLLY SELVIN, RESOLUTION OF MASS TORTS: TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR
EVALUATION OF AGGREGATE PROCEDURES 6 (1988); Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual
Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REv. 845
(1987). On the economic rationale for corrective justice in the private litigation
model, see generally Richard A. Posner, The Concept of CorrectiveJustice in Recent Theories
of Tort Law, 10J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981).
70 This is readily apparent in the case of litigation involving complex economic

data and significant political implications, such as the 1980's saving and loans disaster.
See, e.g., In re American Continental Corp./Lincoln Sav. and Loan Sec. Litig., 130
F.R.D. 475, 476 (JPML 1990).
71 150 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
72 Id. at 561; see also HERBERT B. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS § 5.13 (2d ed. 1975)
(stating that "an important objective of Rule 23 is to allow plaintiffs to vindicate small
claims.").
73 FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a).
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23(a) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedureestablishes four pre-conditions to bringing a voluntary class action:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the inter74
ests of the class.
Class actions are especially appropriate under three conditions: class membership is uniform, the class is united by common
issues of law and fact, and individual claims are representative of
the claims of the class as a whole. 75 The Manualfor Complex Litigation states under subsection 23(b) (3) that a class action is most appropriate "when damages are the only or primary appropriate
relief."7 6
In contrast, a class action ordinarily is inappropriate when
mass default arises in different jurisdictions and when each jurisdiction applies different laws and legal standards to otherwise similar fact patterns.7 7 It is also ill-advised when claimants seek vastly
74

Id.

75 The requirements governing adequacy of class representation under Rule

23(a) (4) are twofold: first, class counsel must be "qualified, experienced and generally able" to conduct the litigation. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a) (4); second, the class members must not be "antagonistic" to one another. Id.; see also Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968). For decisions certifying a class action, see
Durrett v. John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Tex.1993); Shipes v. Trinity Indus.,
987 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1993); Feinberg v. Hibernia Corp., No. CIV.A.90-4245,
1992 WL 176119 (E.D. La.July 14, 1992); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc.,
960 F.2d 285, 290 (2nd Cir. 1992) (certifying a class action because the existence of
nearly 850 claimants dispersed throughout the United States renderedjoinder of the
plaintiffs impracticable). But see Burris v. First Financial Corp., 928 F.2d 797, 806 (8th
Cir. 1991) (finding that the plaintiffs, who purchased mobile homes using retail installment sales contracts, could not serve as class representatives in a suit against two
lenders due to the lack of any cognizable individual claim of relief against them).
76 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b) (3). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (c), in turn, requires that common
questions of law and fact "predominate" over individual issues, and that the class action be the "superior" method of litigating. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure is silent with respect to the global assessment of damages. However, the
Uniform Class Actions Act §§ 15c(5) & (6) does provide for it. For use of this method
of assessing damages, see Samuel v. Univ. of Pitt., 538 F.2d 991, 997-99 (3rd Cir.
1976). On restitutionary damages for breach of contract in general, see generally
Snepp v. United States 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Peter Birks, Restitutionay Damages for
Breach of Contract: Snepp and the Fusion of Law and Equity, 1987 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM.
L.Q. 421 (1987).
77 See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer et al., JudicialFederalism in Action: Coordination of
Litigation in State and FederalCourts, 78 VA. L. REv. 1689, 1695 (1992); see also Richard
A. Seltzer, PunitiveDamages in Mass Tort Litigation: Addressing the Problems of Fairness,
Efficiency and Contro 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 37, 69 (1983); Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing

1994]

CONSUMERS UNITE AGAINST BIG BUSINESS

633

disparate amounts of damages, ranging from minimal property
losses to extensive damages for wrongful death. A class action is
unsuitable when plaintiffs pursue different remedies, such as specific performance and injunctive relief.7"
Antagonists argue that class actions give rise to exorbitant
damages: they over-compensate mass plaintiffs and over-deter default; they encourage class lawyers to settle prematurely in the
hope of securing sizable contingency fees with the least effort;7 9
they lead to bureaucratic justice in which free riders gain as much
as worthy claimants.8 0 However, these arguments apply even more
cogently to individual litigation. Many consumers lack the capacity
or resources to sue. Manipulated by their lawyers, they pay exorbitant contingency fees. Victims of duplicative suit, they pay for the
same legal services which their lawyers provide to others.8 Judge
Carl B. Rubin encapsulated the wasteful attributes of the private
litigation model in relation to 700 Bendectin cases pending in
1984.82 Judge Rubin calculated that hearing all 700 cases individually would consume 21,000 trial days, or roughly 105 judge years,
whereas unifying them in a single class action would reduce the
administrative cost of litigation and limit economic waste.8 3 Similar desire to avoid economic waste surrounded the Wells, Fargo
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure(1), 81
HARV. L. REv. 356, 393 (1967);Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in
Class Actions, 9 BuFF. L. REv. 433, 438-46 (1960).
78 It is possible to separate causes of action in one case. For example, in In re
General Motors Corp., the court allowed a class action settlement for property damage,
but excluded any personal injury claims from the settlement. In re General Motors
Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330, 332, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
79 See, e.g., MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, CASES AND
MATERIALS 448 (2d ed. 1985);John P. Dawson, Lauyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney
Feesfrom Funds, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1597, 1601 (1974); Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 43 (1989). But cf.,John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62 IND. L. REv. 625, 628 (1989);

C.W.

BROOKS, PETTYFOGGERS AND VIPERS OF THE COMMONWEALTH: THE "LOWER
BRANCH" OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND (1986); see alsoYeazell,

supra, at 52.
80 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY

DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983). But see Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27
STAN. L. REV. 937 (1975); Kalven and Rosenfield, supra note 56, at 713.

See supra note 79.
In re "Bendectin" Prod. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239, 240 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 1984),
mandamus granted, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984). Judge Rubin is Chief Judge of the
United States District Court of the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division. Id. at
239.
83 Id. at 240, 240 n.3. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. sold Bendectin, a prescription drug, to offset morning sickness during pregnancy. In re Bendectin Prod.
Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 301-02 (6th Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs alleged that the ingestion
of Bendectin gave rise to an array of birth defects. Id. at 302.
81
82
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Bank case, in which potential litigants exceeded 150,000.84 The
General Motors P/U Truck litigation, in which potential litigants
exceeded 5 million, contained an even more ominous threat of
economic waste.8 5
The resort to class actions is evident in a series of tort cases.
Class actions were mounted in cases involving mass asbestos inhalation s6 and Agent Orange poisoning. 7 They have redressed intrauterine damage caused by the Dalkon Shield IUD"8 and the side
effects of the drug Bendectin,8 9 among other losses.9" In establishing a workable schedule of damages, each class action has served as
an effective measure of public risk management.9 1 Each has
sought to avoid the ill-effects of time-consuming and costly individual suit 92 and at the same time, to relieve defaulters of the duplicative costs of private suit. 93 Moreover, class actions have attempted
to counter "the deliberate policies of businesses [to] . . . tailor
safety investments to profit margins."9 4 The superiority of class actions over private litigation is summarized by judge Easterbrook in
Rand v. Monsanto Co.:
Class actions assemble small claims-usually too small to be
worth litigating separately, but repaying the effort in the

aggregate.9 6
While the voluntary class action is significantly more effective
See supra notes 15-17 (discussing the Wells Fargo case).
In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
See, e.g., Waldron v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 124 F.R.D. 235 (N.D. Ga. 1988), mandamus granted, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984);Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d
468 (5th Cir. 1986). See generally DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., ASBESTOS IN THE
COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS (1985) (RAND CORPORATION'S INSTI84
85
86

TUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE).
87 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y.
88 In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526

1983).
F. Supp. 887
(N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
89 In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 102 F.R.D. 239 (S.D. Ohio), mandamus
granted, 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); see also In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415
(W.D. Mo.), vacated, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982).
90 See In re Beverly Hills Fire Litig., 695 F.2d 207 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
non Bryant Electric Co. v. Kaiser, 461 U.S. 929 (1983).
91 See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of PublicRisk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 331 (1985); Spencer R.Williams, Mass Tort Class
Actions: Going Going Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323 (1982).
92 See Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
93 See, e.g., Sherman, Class Actions and DuplicativeLitigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507 (1987);
7A C.A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1780 (1986).
94 Rosenberg, supra note 64, at 855.
95 926 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1991).
96 Id. at 599; see also Cutler v. 65 Sec. Plan, 831 F. Supp. 1008 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
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than private litigation in redressing mass default, the right to opt
out of a voluntary class can replicate the problems associated with
individuated suit.9 7 As a lineage of asbestos cases makes apparent,
a voluntary class suit assures neither mass participation in the class
nor an equitable remedy. 98 The class may include only a minute
proportion of prospective claimants or fail to deplete the defaulter's windfall arising from mass default, allowing the defaulter
to continue .to breach with impunity.
There is also the risk that duplicative class actions will be
brought in a variety of jurisdictions. Claimants in different actions
will be treated unequally, while aggressive claimants will sue separately, in conflict with the interests of both the voluntary class and
the defendant. In Durrett v. John Deere Co.,99 the court stated:
The court is therefore in the unfortunate posture [in light of
the large number of opt out notices issued by plaintiffs] of dealing with reams of briefs regarding certification issues, holding a
certification hearing and certifying a class only to be left with
the well-founded concern that the Court's new, copiously
wrought and filled basket will empty itself of its own accord. Redundant suits would be legion and the defendants would be left
to fight a thousand front war. 100
Unlike a voluntary class action, a mandatory class action prohibits individuals from suing separately with respect to the same
cause of action. 10 1 A mandatory class action arises in two situations
under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure.1 °2 First, the rules require a
97 Durrett v. John Deere Co., 150 F.R.D. 555, 560 (N.D. Tex. 1993). The Durrett
Court stated that "[blecause of Rule 23(b)(3)'s opt out component, certification
under that rule will compel patently inefficient results, both in terms of court time
and effort and of party-especially defendant-time and effort, not to mention
money." Id.
98 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos-Carnage,
Cover-up, and Litigation, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1693, 1701 (1986) (book review); Christopher F. Edley & Paul C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-DollarCrisis, 33 HARv. J. ON
LEGIS. 383, 384 (1993).
99 150 F.R.D. 555 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
100 Id. at 561.

101 See infra note 106.

102 SeeFED. R.Cv.P.23(b) (1)(A), 23(b) (1)(B),and (b)(2). Rule 23 (b)(1) states:

An action may be maintained as a class action if (1) The prosecution of
separate actions by or against individuals members of the class would
create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to
individual members of the class which would establish incomparable
standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not
parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.
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mandatory class action when "individual actions create a risk of incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class
.... "103 For example, in the absence of a mandatory class action,
one court might enjoin the party from acting while another might
permit such an action. Second, the rules demand a mandatory
class action when "individual actions threaten the disposition or
impairment of other claimant's interests not joined in the action."' 4 This arises when a series of individual actions are likely to
reduce the defendant's limited fund, satisfying some claimants
05
while leaving others uncompensated. 1
A mandatory class action ordinarily unites an otherwise dispersed class, ensuring that mass consumers with comparable losses
can proceed more equitably and more efficiently against the defendant than in voluntary class actions."'b It prohibits sub-classes
of plaintiffs from suing the mass defaulter separately, in disregard
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(1).
Rule 23(b) (2) relates to injunctive relief through a class action, as distinct from
.money damages." As this article deals with money damages, it will not address Rule
23(b) (2).
103 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1) (A).
104 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B).
105 As the court stated in In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc.:
[S]ome members of the putative class might attempt to maintain costly
individual actions in the hope and, perhaps, the belief that their claims
are more meritorious than the claims of other class members. A
mandatory class action . .. is thus necessary ...

to prevent claimants

with such motivations from unfairly diminishing the eventual recovery
of other class members.
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960 F.2d 285, 292 (2nd Cir. 1992). On
the exhaustion of the defendant's limited fund, see Cutler v. 65 Sec. Plan, 831 F.
Supp. 1008, 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 960
F.2d at 292.
106 In issue is not whether claimants seek certification as a voluntary or a mandatory
class, nor whether the court deems the action a mandatory class action. The point is,
simply, that a mandatory class action is generally more efficient and fairer to litigants
than a voluntary class action in mass consumer disputes. See Comment, In re Joint
Eastern and Southern DistrictsAsbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged-A Proposalfor
the Use of FederalCommon Law in Mass Tort ClassActions, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 553, 596-601
(1992); Kevin H. Hudson, Comment, Catch-23(b)(1)(B): The Dilemma of Using the
Mandatory Class Action to Resolve the Problems of the Mass Tort Case, 40 EMORY L.J. 665,
696, 697 (1991); H.B. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS, § 409 et seq. (2d ed. 1985); 7 C.A.
WRIGHr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1774 (2d ed. 1986); In reJoint E.
and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. 134 F.R.D. 32, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (mandatory class action
instituted in asbestos manufacturing context); Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking &
Trust Co., 96 F.R.D. 567, 573 (D.C. Pa. 1983) (certifying a mandatory class action
consisting of investors of bankrupt corporation); Bradford Trust Co. v. Wright, 70
F.R.D. 323, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1976) (class created consisting of employees who participated in defendant corporation's profit-sharing plan).
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of the interest of the class of victims as a whole,10 7 and prevents
aggressive claimants from exhausting the defendant's limited fund
through first-come first-served individual suits or voluntary class actions. It also allows plaintiffs to proceed in a single locus. As a
result, a mandatory class action promotes substantive justice both
among claimants and between the defaulter and mass claimants.
For example, in taking account of the total loss incurred, it ensures
that no one plaintiff is compensated proportionately less or more
than any other. 10 8 While prohibiting opt out claimants from suing
separately, it also disrupts the defendant's business less than a multitude of voluntary and private class actions mounted in multiple
locations. 9 As the court stated in Durrett v. John Deere Co, "multicourt adjudication would be like death by 10,000 cuts to any defendant, win or lose."1 10
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure demonstrate the advantage
of proceeding by mandatory class action. Rule 23(b) (1) (A) specifically provides that the defendant need not pay damages in one jurisdiction when another jurisdiction grants a decree of specific
performance. 1 1' A mandatory class action also frees society from
the burden of multiple suits that ultimately cripple the defendant,
to the loss of employees, creditors, and customers at large. 1 2 One
107 For example, aggressive customers can undermine a voluntary class action in a
manner which they could not accomplish through mandatory action. Motivated by
the prospect of a quick fix at a low cost, aggressive complainants could secure a respectable settlement through a separate deal with the defaulter. In addition, they
could divert the defaulter's energies away from the class and also drain its coffers.
This separate deal could also have an adverse psychological and financial impact
upon the class, further reducing its numbers and sources of financing.
On the extent to which voluntary class actions benefit the educated and pecuniary, see, e.g., THOMAS C. BARrsH ET AL., A CLAss-AcTION Surr THAT WoRKED 57
(1978);Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class
Actions and the Substance-ProcedureDilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 842 (1974).
108 See Rose, supra note 58, at 1214-15 (1983); cf., The Proposed Uniform Class Action Act: The Special Committee on Uniform Class Actions Act, National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, C.A.R. Comment, 4 CLAss ACrION REP. 190
(1975).
109 See, e.g.,Judith Resnik, From "Cases"to "Litigation",54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5,
49 (1991); Bone, supra note 68, at 232; Yeazell, supra note 79, at 52.
110 150 F.R.D. 555, 560 (N.D. Tex. 1993).
111 On the rules governing where a mandatory class action can be brought, see
Kaplan, supra note 77, at 389-94; Weinstein, supra note 77, at 457-60; Seltzer, supra
note 77, at 63-71. See also Schwarzer et al., supra note 77, at 1695.
112 The demise of the defendant's business has diverse social effects. For example,
it can force the state to assume some of the defendant's obligations, notable, to find
alternative work for, or to otherwise support, the defendant's employees. It can also
lead to the increased prices of comparable goods and services in the marketplace. On
the history and social significance of defendant bankruptcies arising out of mass class
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need merely contemplate the calamity that would have arisen had
the five million purchasers of General Motors' defective pickup
truck each sued General Motors independently. Such suits by each
purchaser would have resulted in duplicative litigation ad infinitum, or worse still, would have brought civil litigation to a grinding
113
halt.
Despite its virtues," 4 courts traditionally have construed
mandatory class actions as undue restrictions on the right of the
individual to sue separately from the class.' 5 Some judges have
maintained that class certification hearings and notice requirements are time consuming and involve undue expense.' 1 6 Others
have insisted that inconsistent decisions do not give rise to the risk
of incompatible standards of conduct under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A)." 7
Whatever their reasons, courts generally have refused to mandate
class actions in either contract or tort. 118

Some judges, however, have mandated class actions under
litigation, see the discussion of the Johns-Manville and Dalkon Shield case, supra note
67.
113 See In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330, 346 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
114 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
115 See, e.g., 1 H.B. NEWBERG, CLASS AcTIONS, § 5.05 et seq. (2d ed. 1985); 7B C.A.
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 1785 to 1787 (2d ed. 1986).
116 See NEWBERG, supra note 115; WRIGHT, supra note 115.
117 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., C.D. of Cal., 523 F.2d 1083,
1086 (9th Cir. 1975). There, the court held that the risk of inconsistent judgements
awarded to 335 people killed in an airplane crash did not constitute a risk of incomparable standards of conduct under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (1) (A). Id. As a result, it
declined to certify the class. Id. at 1087.
118 On the reasons for denying mandatory class actions in mass tort litigation, see
Yandle v. PGG Indus., Inc., 65 F.R.D. 566, 571-72 (E.D. Tex. 1974). In Yandle, the
court stated:
The policy reasons for the disallowance of class actions in mass tort
cases generally fall into three categories. First of all there is the general
feeling that when personal injuries are involved that each person should
have the right to prosecute his own claim and be represented by the
lawyer of his choice. Secondly, that the use of this procedure may encourage solicitation of business by attorneys. And finally that individual
issues may predominate because the tortfeasor's defenses may depend
on facts peculiar to each plaintiff.
Id. at 569 (citing 7A. WRIGHT AND MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1783
(1972)); see also Cutler v. 65 Sec. Plan, 831 F. Supp. 1008, 1021 (E.D.N.Y. 1993);
Kaplan, supra note 77, at 393. Although not specifically articulated, comparable reasons for denying mandatory class actions likely apply to mass contract cases. Contracts, supposedly, are personal to each consumer; each has her own discrete cause of
action and each should be free to sue independently of all other consumers. Conversely, the defendant should not have to defend a class action when it has different
defenses to each discrete claim against it. Finally, lawyers should be discouraged from
soliciting mass contract business, just as they are discouraged from soliciting mass tort
business.
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Rule 23(b)(1)(B). 1 19 Where the defaulter has a limited fund or
where a series of individual suits would exhaust that fund, courts
have stated that allowing such suits would bankrupt the defendant. 120 Others have recognized that a mandatory class action is less
12
costly than a multiplicity of individual and voluntary class suits. '

Still others have noted that a mandatory class action avoids the
crippling effect of duplicative punitive damages awarded against
the defaulter. 22 The result has been to combine private suit with
public interest litigation. The individual has sacrificed the right to
sue privately that few ordinarily could enjoy in return for a greater
benefit that many could share.
This is not to suggest that mandatory class actions are inherently superior to both individual suit and voluntary class actions.
Mandatory class actions can be cumbersome, costly, fractious and
ineffective. They can fail to respond to the call for "substantial
modifications in traditional court processes," producing few improvements in the "efficiency and equity of the mass claims resolution process. "1 3 However, suitably utilized, mandatory class
actions can succeed where both individual actions and voluntary
class actions have failed; they can compensate mass victims equita119 On FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(1)(B), see supra note 102.
120 See, e.g., In re"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 724-28 (E.D.N.Y.
1983); In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d
847, 850 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted); Green v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 541
F.2d 1335, 1340 n.9 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Matthew K. Phillips, Comment, Mandating
Mass Tort Class Actions: LitigatingCatastrophesWithout Creating Litigation Catastrophes, 19
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 91, 93-114 (1985); Note, Class Certification in Mass Accident Cases
Under Rule 23(b)(1), 96 HARv. L. REv. 1143, 1159 (1983). The best examples of bankruptcies arising in the wake of class actions are the Johns-Manville and Dalkon Shield
cases. See In reJohns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 743 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re A.H.
Robins Co., 63 B.R. 986 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986), affd sub nom. Grady v. A.H. Robins
Co., 839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988); cert. dismissed sub nom. Joynes v. A.H. Robins 487
U.S. 1260 (1988); see also Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Sheild Claimants Trust: Paradign Lost (orFound)?, 61 FoRDRAm
L. REv. 617, 626-31 (1992); Feinberg, supranote 67,
at 101; Smith, supra note 67.
121 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 720.
122 Id.; see also In re N. Dist. of Cal, Dalkon Shield Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d at 852.
The scope of this article does not permit discussion of choice of jurisdiction and law
issues, including the method of ensuring that, in bringing a mandatory class action in
one jurisdiction, another action is not joined elsewhere. See generally Schwarzer et al.,
supra note 77 (concluding that informal coordination between jurisdictions can advance judicial economy, fairness and efficiency when the underlying litigation spans
state and federal courts).
123 Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REv. 89, 90 (1989); see also Albert W. Alschuler, "Close Enough for Government Work":
The Exclusionary Rule after Leon, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 345 (1984); Albert W. A]schuler, Mediation With a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and the Need for a
Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1808, 1812 (1986).
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bly and deter mass default 2as
well as reduce the waste of both pri4
resources.'
public
and
vate
Mandatory class actions are especially useful in mass consumer
contracts. As the Wells Fargo dispute illustrates, individual consumers have little incentive to sue on their own when their individual claims are small. Moreover, they have little to lose by having
their right to private litigation restricted by a mandatory class suit.
The mandatory action ensures that they share in both the costs and
the fruits of their collective labor. In addition, the mandatory action protects the defendant from the crippling effects of defending
against different private and voluntary suits arising out of comparable causes of action.
In summary, the private litigation model ordinarily fails in
mass consumer transactions. Most consumers lack the resources to
sue the defaulter privately. Either they cannot afford to hire highpriced lawyers to match those available to the defaulter, or they
cannot fund a protracted suit. Those who proceed privately risk
becoming victims of lawyers who profit from their client's lack of
legal and market sophistication. Those who win are likely to lose
more in court costs, attorney's fees, and aggravation than they
gain. Given these limitations, the private litigation model fails to
promote social justice when the public cost of private suit is signifi125
cant and when duplicative suits lead to economic waste.
In expanding upon the private litigation model, a class action
reduces the social cost of replicated litigation. It encourages consumers with comparable causes of action to mount a united front
in place of a plethora of private actions. It provides consumers in
general with a shared means of redressing a recurrent threat and
impedes lawyers from charging multiple contingency fees in multiple private suits.
However, a mandatory class action surpasses the benefits provided by class actions in general. Not only does it avoid deficiencies associated with the private litigation model in mass consumer
cases. It also transcends the voluntary class action in redressing
those deficiencies.

124 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for PrivateEnforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669, 679 (1986); Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34
STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1982); see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the judge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1283 (1976).
125 See supra § IV.
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THE PUBLIC INTEREST TRUST

A mandatory class action is especially effective when coupled
with a public interest trust. 126 A public interest trust holds the defendants' excess savings or profits arising from mass default that
are not disbursed among claimants in trust for specific public interests.1 2 7 This excess arises when mass victims of default fail to claim
their proportionate share of the mass award because they are unaware of their losses, are disinterested in making a claim, have left
the jurisdiction, or are deceased. The public interest trust disburses the difference between mass damages that are awarded
against the defaulter and the total quantity of claims that are made
by legitimate claimants.
A public interest trust is especially appropriate in consumer
class actions. In such actions, mass default likely impacts upon consumers in general; members of the class action are usually underrepresentative of the victims of mass default, and the return of the
excess to the defaulter would not deter the defendant from future
default. 128 In addition, claimants who might otherwise have declined to join the class action because of the prospects' of receiving
only a limited award might now join because they associate the
class action with a public interest endeavor with which they
identify.
The Wells Fargo Bank and the General Motors P/U Truck
cases both illustrate the case for a public interest trust. In the Wells
Fargo dispute, the Bank paid only $1.5 million out of a possible
29
$6.5 to $13.5 million in claims to only 3% of potential claimants.'
In the General Motors case, experts estimated that General Motors
would pay only $2.024 billion out of a possible $5 billion to only
34% to 38% of potential claimants.13 0 A public interest trust could
have ensured that both Wells Fargo Bank and General Motors pay
their excess savings arising from mass default to the trust for public
126 Arguably, this problem arises in relation to legal action in general. Individuals
are unlikely to sue when they anticipate receiving scant reward from suit. Their disincentive to sue, however, is offset by the extent to which they believe that they will

benefit collectively from suit. For example, they are more likely to join a class when
they believe that doing so likely will.minimize their individual costs, while maximizing
their individual benefits. They are also more likely to favor a mandatory class action
that redresses public concerns that reinforce their own interests.
127 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(1)(A).
128 On the risk that the defendant will save or profit from mass default, see infra
note 153.
129 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 22.
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disbursement. The result would have been both to benefit consumers at large and to deter comparable default in the future.
Coupling the remedies of class claimants with public interest
trusts also offers enormous private and public benefit. For example, claimants can receive compensation in the first instance in
32
31
proportion to their actual losses,1 or failing that, equally.1
Thereafter, the court can require the defaulter to contribute to the
well-being of specific consumers or consumers in general. This can
1 33
be accomplished retroactively or prospectively, through escheat,
the rollback of consumer prices,1 3 1 consumer price discounts, or

131 The intention here is to limit the benefit which free-rider claimants receive
from suit or settlement. However, by itself, this is an inadequate means of accomplishing that end. Free riders may be quite happy to pay their proportionate share.
They may join because success appears to be imminent, and the cost of joining is
small. One method of dealing with free-riders is to require parties who join late to
contribute back-costs to the class, or alternatively, to discount their benefit from suit
according to the time at which or the condition under which they joined.
The allocation of funds pro rata among claimants is also of limited value when
claimants whoj 6 in discourage others from joining the class action in the interests of
maximizing their proportionate shares of existing class members. This concern is
especially problematic when class members represent an elite, and when that elite
devises barriers to exclude others from joining the class. These barriers to entry are
all the more troubling in consumer class actions in which there are a few claimants.
This occurs when these are well educated and financially secure, and when they use
their education and resources to exclude others who are less well endowed from joining suit, or alternatively, when they sabotage the class suit by securing a private settlement at its expense. See generally NEWBERG, supra note 20, Appendix 8-4, at 206;
BARTSH ET AL., supra note 107.
132 This equal distribution occurs because courts and tribunals are reluctant to evaluate the merits of each individual claim, because doing so would give rise to a trial
within a trial, and because the result would be costly. See, e.g., Lagakos & Mosteller,
Assigned Shares .in Compensation for Radiation-Related Cancers, 6 RISK ANALVsis 345
(1986); Rosenberg, The Uncertainties of Assigned Shares Tort Compensation: What We
Don't Know Can Hurt Us, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 363 (1986). The problem with this egalitarian approach is that it can lead to both inefficiencies and injustice. This is especially
so when the interests of claimants with significant losses are marginalized by the significantly lesser interests of other claimants. The alternative is to award damages in
proportion to each claimant's loss, subject to that claimant's reasonable capacity to
prove it at a reasonable cost. See generally infra note 197.
133 Under the principle of escheat, property reverts to the state on the grounds that
no individual or other legal entity is reasonably entitled to it. See NEWBERG, supra note
20, § 10.19. I do not favor resort to escheat on the grounds that a state that is interested in the outcome of a class action is less likely to provide institutional support for
such an action. In addition, property that reverts to the state by escheat ceases to
redress the interests of specific consumers, unless the state itself so decides. Finally,
other interested groups, such as consumer and public interest groups, are both usually identifiable and more worthy recipients of cy pres funds. See also infra note 135.
134 See, e.g., 1 NEWBERG, supranote 20, § 10.17 to 10.19; see also Michael Malina, Fluid
Class Recovery as a ConsumerRemedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 477, 482 (1972).
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other consumer services.1 3 5 The court can also require the trust to
contribute to public works programs, hospitals, schools, and tenancy organizations." 6
A public interest trust can redress both the interests of the
class and the interests of society at large. The court can allocate to
it the profits or savings that the defendant otherwise might continue to horde at the public's expense. The public trust thereafter
can disburse trust funds in the public interest to avoid the effects of
comparable default in the future. For example, in the Wells Fargo
dispute, the bank paid claimants less than $1.5 million of an estimated $6.5 to $13.5 million in total claims. A public interest trust
could have disbursed the unclaimed funds in the public interest.
This would have prevented the bank from benefitting from its default and likely would have deterred similar action in the future.
The flexible remedies associated with a public interest trust
can protect the defaulter by not requiring it to face an overbearing
financial threat immediately and by according it positive publicity.
For example, the trust can construct a scheme, in consultation with
a mass defaulter like General Motors, to disburse coupons or other
benefits to a full class of injured consumers. 3 7 It can also benefit
class members who are assured of receiving something in futuro,
rather than nothing, should a current award exhaust the limited
fund of the defaulter. At the same time, it can benefit a consuming
public that often bears the residual burden of mass default.
This resort to a public interest trust in mass consumer disputes
is not a mere flight of fancy. Mass consumer disputes in both tort
and contract use public interest trusts. For example, following the
Three Mile Island nuclear accident, the court-approved settlement
created a public health fund to finance scientific studies of the biological impact of radiation exposure.13 8 Similarly, an energy con135 See, e.g., Butowsky v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, C.A. No. 71-1086K
(D. Mass. filed 1975).
136 See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
affd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Coder Drugs, Inc. v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); People v. Parkmerced Co, 244 Cal. Rptr. 22, 26 (1988);
Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 382 F.
Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
'37 See In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The
defaulter likely gains positive publicity in being identified with the public interest
objectives of the trust. Initially, that publicity acts as a counterbalance to the negative
publicity arising from the class action. In time, however, while consumers continue to
associate the continuing benefits derived from the public interest trust with the defendant, they are likely to forget that the defendant's initial default gave rise to the
trust. As a consequence, the defaulter gains net positive publicity in the long term.
138 See, e.g., In re Three Mile Island Litigation, 557 F. Supp. 96, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
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servation trust assumed responsibility to disburse damages secured
from an oil company that overcharged its customers.13 9 Somewhat
more celebrated, the United States District Court ordered A.H.
Robins Company, the manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, to contribute almost $2.5 million to a public indistribution among approximately 200,000 users of
terest trust for
4
its product. 1
The California case of People v. Parkmerced Co."' illustrates this
resort to a public interest trust. There, the California Court of Appeals approved the trial court's order which resulted in a residue of
security deposits wrongfully withheld by lessors from their tenants. 142 The order disgorged the defaulter's savings arising from
mass default by placing the residue in a trust with designated tenants' organizations. 4 The court reduced its own supervision and
administration costs by disbursing the residue not paid to claimants to reputable public interest organizations. Finally, the order
benefitted a class of tenants that might otherwise have been subject
to comparable default had the
public interest trust not been ap4
1
ends.1
common
their
to
plied
In summation, the mandatory class action coupled with the
public interest trust can effectively compensate mass victims and
deter mass default of consumer contracts. This communitarian approach stresses the need for those who are similarly situated to join
139 United States v. Exxon Corp., 561 F. Supp. 816, 856 (D.D.C. 1983), affd, 773
F.2d 1240 (T.E.C.A. 1985), cert. denied sub nom. Marathon Petroleum Co. v. United
States, 474 U.S. 1105, reh'gdenied,Exxon Corp. v. United States, 474 U.S. 1112 (1986).
On the Petroleum Violation Escrow Account (PVEA) cases, including the use of such
funds, see generally Susan E. Nash, Note, Collecting Overchargesfrom the Oil Companies:
The Department of Energy's Restitutionary Obligation, 32 STAN. L. REv. 1039 (1980).
140 See In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp.
887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom. A.H.
Robins Co., Inc. v. Abed, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).
141 People v. Parkmerced Co, 244 Cal. Rptr. 22 (Ct. App. 1988).
142 Id. at 27.
143 Id.
144 Id. In passing on control over residuary funds to public interest organizations,
courts still can ensure the reasonable and proper liquidation of trust funds by imposing reasonable requirements upon those organizations. For example, they can establish a monitoring committee to scrutinize the organization's financial statements and
audited balance sheets. They can create special conditions governing the use of the
funds. Typical among these is the requirement that trust funds be placed in special
interest bearing accounts, and further, that public interest officers responsible to administer trust funds not benefit directly from them. See, e.g., NEWBERG, supra note 20,
§ 12.05, at 527 n.30, § 12.25, at 565 (citing Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Chas Pfizer & Co.,
481 F.2d 1045, 1048 n.2 (2d Cir. 1973)). See generally Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, ClaimsProcedures in Large Consumer Class Actions and EquitableDistributionof Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 747, 769 (1988).
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together to protect themselves from an otherwise dominant foe.
The remainder of the article discusses the workings of this proposed system.
VI.

APPLYING THE PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES

The private interest of each victim in receiving compensation
and the public's interest in deterring mass default aim at achieving
several objectives: the defaulter should relinquish savings or profits arising from mass default; the settlement should allocate these
savings or profits among those who are subject to, or adversely affected by, that default, including public interest organizations; and
the court should effect this allocation equitably in the interests of
harmonious and stable consumer relations.14 5 The public interest
trust combined with a mandatory class action accomplishes these
objectives by disgorging and allocating savings or profits: first,
among customers who join the mass suit; second, among customers
who are unable to join it initially,1 4 6 but make a claim against it
later;14 7 third, among incidental claimants who mitigate losses or
damages caused to mass victims; 148 and fourth, by passing the residue on to a public interest trust for specific or general consumer
benefit.1 49 Specific principles govern this ascending order of distribution. This method leaves no claimant free to sue independently
of the class if he or she satisfies the requirements to join the
class. 50 No claimant sustains the full, or undue, burden of attorney's fees, court costs, work disruption, and the dilatory tactics of
the defaulter. 5 1 Claimants who lack the legal and financial resources to sue discretely are encouraged to join the class. 52
The section below proposes practical ways to disgorge the defaulter's savings or profits arising from mass default and to allocate
145 See generally supra note 144 and infra note 147.
146 On such claimants, see infra § VI, C.
147 See generally Colloquy: An Administrative Alternative to Tort Litigation to Resolve Asbestos Claims, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 1817 (1992) (discussing resort to distribution funds for
the distribution and allocation of mass damage awards among claimants in general).
148 On such incidental claimants, see infra note 199.
149

Applied to a defaulting bank, incidental claimants might be public housing au-

thorities who subsidize mortgages to the extent of the bank's surcharge in breach of
contract. On such incidental claimants, see infra § VI, C, 1.
150 See supra note 101.
151 See supra note 62.
152 Not raised here, but supportable in fact, mass claimants who are contributorily
at fault in causing their own loss should not be compensated to the extent of that
fault. Such contributory liability arises, for example, when a plaintiff anticipates the
risk of loss arising from mass default, when that plaintiff is able to avert or mitigate
that loss, and when he fails to do so in fact. See infra § VI, C, 1.
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these among mass victims. The overall goal is to redress private
and public harm, including harm to the defaulter, in an equitable
and efficient manner.'5 3 The functional end is to arrive at a viable
solution in cases of mass default. This is accomplished in consumer transactions by assessing the quantum of savings arising
from mass default, the class of persons affected by it, and the proportionate award of the savings or profits to each member of the
class.'" The beneficiaries of the class action are the mass victims
and the public at large. Finally, the goal is neither to replicate the
criminal justice system, 15 5 nor deny punitive damages in cases of
153 The distribution of savings or profit acquired from mass default has a deterrent
design: the fact that the promisor must give up savings or profits acquired from
breach both compensates mass victims and deters breach. For an historical perspective see Rene Demogue, Validity of the Theory of Compensation Damages, 27 YALE L.J. 585,
589 (1918).
154 See generally Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial
Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REv. 471 (1985) (discussing the appointment of a special
master to assist in determining the nature of loss). But see John P. Bermingham, Extending Good Faith: Does the U. C. C. Impose a Duty of Good FaithNegotiation Under Changed

Circumstances?, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. Ruv. 217, 220 (1987). See generally E. ALLAN FARNsWORTH, CoNrRAcrs § 9.9 n.33 (2d ed. 1990); Michael D. Lieder, Constructing a New
Action for Negligent Infliction of Economic Loss: Buildingon Cardozo and Coase, 66 WASH. L.
REv. 937 (1991) (explaining the calculation of economic loss in negligence cases);
For a discussion of claims procedures in class actions, see Hillebrand & Torrence,
supra note 144, at 748-51. On the influence of expert testimony on jurors' assessments of damage, see generally Allan Raitz et al., DeterminingDamages: The Influence of
Expert Testimony on Jurors'Decision Making, 14 LAw & HUM. BEtAv. 385 (1990).
155 Courts that grant punitive damages in tort sometimes emphasize the limitations
of the criminal justice system. See, e.g, Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr.
348, 389 (1981); cf. Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Use of CriminalStatutes to Regulate Product
Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1984); John C. Coffee, Jr., Making Punishment Fit the
Corporation: The Problem of FindingAn Optimal Criminal Sanction, I N. ILL. U. L. REv. 3
(1980). On congressional authorization of both criminal sanctions and punitive damages see, inter alia, 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1976) (violation of copyright laws); I.R.C. § 7213
(unauthorized disclosure of tax returns); 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (violation of antitrust
laws); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976) (violation of patent laws); the Landrum-Griffin Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 411, 412 (1976); the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1374(b), 1472(a)
(1976). See generally Richard Marcus, Punitive Damages Under Federal Statutes: A Functional Analysis, 60 CAL. L. Ruv. 191 (1972) (examining the different purposes of punitive damages awards under federal statutes). For similar authorization to impose both
criminal and civil sanctions in relation to racial discrimination in terms of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982, see Morales v. Haines, 486 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1973); in relation to contract
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Okeson v. Tolley School Dist. No. 25, 570 F. Supp.
408 (D.N.D. 1983); Brown v. Pullard Independent School Dist., 640 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.
1981); City of Newport v. Facts Concerts Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981). On occasions,
courts have invoked punitive damages in order to support a statute. For instance, the
Supreme Court of Nevada stated that "the threat of punitive damages may be the
most effective means of deterring conduct which would frustrate the purpose of our
workmen's compensation laws." Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984)).
See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353, 358 (Ill. 1978). But see, Barr/Nelson, Inc.
v. Tonto's Inc., 336 N.W.2d 46 (Minn. 1983). See generally Charles R. Pengilly, Restitu-
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15 6
wilful or malicious default.

A.

Mass Profits

A mass award aims to remove the defendant's profits arising
from mass default under two conditions: the defendant defaults
wilfully and recklessly and/or disgorging its savings is insufficient
to deter it from mass default. 15 7 For example, a mass defaulter
knowingly fails to avert a risk of harm or injury to mass victims.15 8
The defaulter compensates some victims. However, it continues to
default in respect of others because doing so remains profitable.1 59
tion, Retribution, and the Constitution, 7 ALASKA L. REv. 333 (1990) (assessing the present state of the law of restitution).
156 Arguably, despite the emphasis that punitive damage awards place on punishment, they are more truly deterrent in design. See, e.g., Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d 1282
(Idaho Ct. App. 1984). In Davis, the court stated that "the primary purpose [of punitive damages] is to eliminate the financial incentive that otherwise would exist for
continued future bad conduct if the defendant were required only to compensate the
aggrieved party for his probable losses while retaining any net benefits from the prohibited acts." Id. at 1287.
157 See, e.g., Boise Dodge v. Clark, 453 P.2d 551 (Idaho 1969).
158 This language resembles the language used in punitive damage cases in which
emphasis is given to the defendant's malicious or wanton default. However, the primary intention here, to disgorge the defendant's profits, is compensatory and deterrent, not punitive. On punitive damage awards, see generally Stephen H.
Sneiderman, Note, The Future of Punitive Damages after Browning-Ferris Industries v.
Kelco Disposal, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1031 (1990); Thomas C. Galligan, Augmented Awards:
The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3 (1990). On the virtue of
punitive damage awards in contract, see generally Timothy W. Bjorkman, Comment,
B & M Homes, Inc. v. Hogan: A Breakthrough in the Law's Reluctance to Award Damages
in Contract for Mental Anguish and Other Non-Economic Detriments, 26 S.D. L. REv. 48
(1981); Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, PunitiveDamages: Towards a PrincipledApproach,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980); Steven H. Reisberg, Note, In Defense of PunitiveDamages,
55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 303 (1980); TimothyJ. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the Illusion of Legal Change,61 MINN. L. REv. 207 (1977); Note, The
Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in ContractActions, 8 IND. L. REv. 668 (1975);
Michael Carlton Garrett, Note, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Claims, 6 GA. L. Rrv. 613 (1972). But see Charles M. Louderback & Thomas W. Jurika,
Standardsfor Limiting the Tort of Bad FaithBreach of Contract, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 187, 205,
206 (1981).
159 Such assertions are most appropriate in products liability cases. See, e.g.,
Leichtamer v. American Motor Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 580 (Ohio 1981); Grimshaw v.
Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 361 (Ct. App. 1981); American Motors Corp. v.
Ellis, 403 So. 2d 459, 469 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297
N.W.2d 727, 740 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied sub nom Reigel Textile Corp. v. Gryc, 449
U.S. 921 (1980); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 897, 906 (Wis.
1980); Rinker v. Ford Motor Co., 567 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Gillham v.
Admiral Corp., 523 F.2d 102, 107 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 424 U.S. 913 (1976). See
generally Twerski et al., Shifting Perspectives in Products Liability: From Quality to Process
Standards, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 347 (1980) (recommending that to determine liability for
a defective product, courts should scrutinize the process by which companies make
product design decisions); James A. Henderson, Jr., Manufacturers'Liabilityfor Defective
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Redressing this continuing default is especially appropriate in mass
consumer cases when the defendant uses its position of market
dominance to profit at the expense of a mass of trusting customers.16 ° Disgorging its mass profits is also appropriate when the defaulter denies both its victims and the public at large the
productive use of its goods and services.' 6 1
A court that implements a mandatory class action needs to estimate and disburse the defaulter's savings or profits arising from
mass default. This requires that it establish the size of the
mandatory class, the extent of the mass defaulter's liability, and a
reasonable method of disbursing funds among class members and
in the public interest. To protect both private and public interests,
it also needs to determine when claimants are deserving or contributorily at fault and the extent to which they are entitled to share in
the award.
The court must first formulate a method of determining the
defendant's profits or savings arising from mass default. Expressed
as a formula, the defendant's profits consist of the difference between the market value of non-defective and defective goods or
services, multiplied by the volume of defective goods or services
sold to mass plaintiffs.' 6 2
In practice, both consumer class actions 163 and personal injury
cases 16 4 evidence the capacity of common law courts to determine
the nature of savings or profits arising from mass default. Medical
and pharmaceutical experts have estimated mass harm arising out
Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REv. 625 (1978) (proposing a
product liability statute designed to limit manufacturers' liability); Robert L. Rabin,
Dealing with Disasters: Some Thoughts on the Adequacy of the Legal System, 30 STAN. L. REv.
281 (1978) (assessing the effectiveness of the administrative and judicial process
preventing mass disasters and providing relief after they occur).
160 On such dominance in contractual relations, see generally infra notes 184-88.
161 See Hansen v. Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev. 1984); Davis v. Gage, 682 P.2d
1282, 1287 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984); Jones v. Abriana, 350 N.E.2d 635, 650 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1976).
162 Let PD = Profit From Defective Goods
MG = Market Value of a Non-Defective Unit (Goods or Services)
MD = Market Value of a Defective Unit (Goods or Services)
n
Excess Gain from Defective Units = PD = X (MG - MDi).
i=1

See supra text accompanying note 3.
164 See, e.g., Koslow, supra note 62; see also F.H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive
Fairness, 19 HOFSTRA L. REv. 33 (1990). But see William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency andJustice in Tort Damages: The Shortcomings of the PecuniaryLoss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL
STUD. 347 (1986).
163
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of toxic-shock syndrome (TSS) caused by defective tampons,165
mass uterine infections, and perforations arising from the use of
the Dalkon Shield IUD. 166 Defendants also have enabled courts to
assess mass damages. Johns-Manville projected the extent of its liability arising from future asbestos-related injuries.1 6 7 Ford Motor
Company prepared an internal memorandum outlining the profit168
ability to it of mass default in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co.
While Grimshaw arose as a personal injury case in tort, not as a
property damage case in contract, it usefully illustrates the extent
to which a mass defaulter can profit from default at the expense of
a mass of others. 6 9 The inferences that arise from Grimshaw apply
equally to other cases, such as the dispute between General Motors
and the purchasers of its defective P/U Truck. 7 ° In both cases,
the defendant secured a windfall because it compensated only
some prospective claimants for their losses.
According to the Grush-Saunby Report, an internal document
prepared by Ford Motor Company, Ford anticipated that it would
profit considerably by not recalling and repairing the Ford
Pinio. 171 In particular, it anticipated a cost of $137 million were it
to recall all 11 million Pinto cars and 1.5 million Pinto light trucks
and repair them at a cost of $11 per vehicle.1 72 However, it estimated a much lower total cost of $49.5 million arising from suit or
settlement were it to decline to recall and defend each claim
against it.1 73 It estimated, further, that it would need to compensate only 180 persons for death or injury, and 2,100 persons for the
loss of their vehicles. 1 74 As a result, Ford anticipated an overall sav165 On TSS, (toxic-shock syndrome), see Leanne Crane Castafero, Comment, Coping With the ParticularizedProblems of Toxic Tort Litigation, 28 VILL. L. Rv. 1083 (1983);
David Ranii, Male Files Suit Over Toxic Shock, NAT'L L.J. 3 (July 4, 1983); Center for
Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Follow-up on Toxic-Shock Syndrome - United States, 29 MORBID. & MORTAL. WEEK. REP. 297 (1980).

See supra notes 87 and 119 (discussing the Dalkon Shield litigation).
SeeJackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 524 (1984).
168 See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 369-70 (Ct. App. 1981).
169 While Grimshaw, is founded in tort, it arises out of a series of discrete transactions between Ford Motor Company, its dealers, and a mass of parties who purchased
the Ford Pinto or were injured as a result of a defect in the gas tank. Id. at 359. In
addition, it readily demonstrates the problem that occurs when defaulters intend
neither to perform adequately, nor to compensate the end-users of their products.
170 See supra note 18.
171 See Grimshaw, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
172 This table is reproduced in W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND
SAFETY' CASES AND MATERIALS 490-91 (1980).
166
167

173

Id.

174

Id.
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ing of $87.5 million. 175
In the Grush-Saunby Report, originally intended as an internal
memorandum, Ford estimated its savings on costs arising out of
176
not recalling the Pinto.
BENEFITS AND COSTS RELATING TO FUEL LEAKAGE

ASSOCIATED WITH THE STATIC ROLLOVER TEST
PORTION OF
BENEFITS:

Savings:

FMVSS 208

180 burn deaths, 180 serious burn

injuries, 2100 burned vehicles.
Unit Cost:
$200,000 per death, $67,000 per injury;
$700 per vehicle.
Total Benefits:
180 x ($200,000), 180 x ($67,000), 2100
x ($700) = $49.5 million.
11 million cars, 1.5 million light trucks.
CosTs:
Sales:
$11 per car, $11 per truck.
Unit Cost:
11,000,000 x 177
($11), 1,500,000 x ($11) Total Cost:
$137 million.
Ford based this report on several assumptions. Most Ford Pinto
users would not sustain personal or property damage. An even
smaller minority would die or be injured. Persons who suffered
personal loss likely would sue Ford. Persons who sustained limited
property damage likely would not. As a result, Ford anticipated
savings in having to compensate only some, but not all, victims for
their losses.
Ford's knowledge about the default and its intention not to
compensate mass victims for their lossesjustifies forcing companies
like Ford to disgorge their profits arising from mass default, as proposed in this article. The actual or prospective losses incurred by
the consumers warrant forcing Ford to compensate mass victims.
Placing Ford's excess profits in a public interest trust is both equitable and efficient. Such a trust can compensate prospective claimants; it can contribute to consumer awareness and safety programs
and educate the public about consumer protection. 17 Finally, the
proposal does not penalize Ford by forcing it to disgorge its mass
1 80 not punitive. 18 1
profits. 1 79 Ford's liability remains compensatory,
175
176
177

Id.

Id.

Id. On the American Motors litigation, see Leichtamer v. American Motors
Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981) (award of $1.1 million punitive damages). See also
Ford Motor Co. v. Nowack, 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
178 See infra notes 222-25.
179 See supra note 162.
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The method of calculating Ford's exact profits arising from
mass default is not self-evident. For example, it is difficult to assess
the precise extent to which the value of Ford's vehicles might have
decreased had the public known about the defective Pinto at the
outset. It is also difficult to determine the exact loss of business
which Ford would have incurred had it not repressed information
about the defect in the Pinto. However, these difficulties in assessing damages are not insurmountable. Class action lawyers can examine expert witnesses to identify the existence of mass default
and the extent of loss arising from it, including the risk of depleting the defendant's limited fund. They can estimate the defendant's profit or savings from business records, memoranda, balance

sheets, and other accounting documentation. 182 They can also impose the burden of proof on the defendant on grounds that it is
unfair to require plaintiffs to adduce evidence about profits and
savings that is more accessible to the defendant.'
They can issue
180 Courts frequently restrict the imposition of punitive damages to instances of
fraudulent, deceitful or malicious conduct. See United Euram Corp. v. Occidental

Petrol. Corp., 474 N.Y.S.2d 372, 375 (Sup. Ct. 1984); Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (App. Div. 1978), appeal dismissed, 46
N.Y.2d 904 (1978). But cf Walker v. Sheldon, 179 N.E.2d 497, 498 (N.Y. 1961). Arguably, deceit is relevant in mass restitution cases. In addition, conscious indifference
towards the well-being of others is likely to be reflected in both punitive damage and
mass restitution cases. See Quedding v. Arisumi Bros., Inc., 661 P.2d 706 (Haw. 1983)
(justifying punitive damages "where the defendant's conduct evinced a high degree of
moral turpitude and demonstrated such wanton dishonesty as to imply a criminal
indifference to civil obligations"); Walsh v. Alfidi, 448 So. 2d 1084, 1086-87 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1984) (justifying punitive damages "where there is evidence that the defendant acted with malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, willfulness, or reckless indifference to the rights of others"); see also Pesaplastic, C.A. v. Cincinnati Milacron Co., 750
F.2d 1516, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985); Nichols v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306
S.E.2d 616, 620 (S.C. 1983); Armstrong v. Republic Realty Mortgage Corp., 631 F.2d.
1344, 1352 (8th Cir. 1980); Pollock v. Brown, 569 S.W.2d 724, 733 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc); Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49, 51 (Fla. 1974); Evans v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 212 A.2d 440, 443 (Pa. 1965). For authority which downplays vindictive
or vengeful punishment as the foundation of punitive damages, see Wedeman v. City
Chevrolet Co., 366 A.2d 7 (Md. 1976); Jolley v. Puregro Co., 496 P.2d 939 (Idaho
1972).
181 See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 359 (Ct. App. 1981); Frank
W. Allen, Product Liability Law and Motor Vehicle Design, 14 U. TOL. L. Rv. 301 (1983);
David G. Owen, CrashworthinessLitigation and Punitive Damages, 4 J. PROD. LLAB. 221
(1981); Malcolm E. Wheeler, Product Liability, Civil or Criminal - The Pinto Litigation, 17
FORUM 250 (1981).
182 See supra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
183 However, this burden of disproof should only shift to the defaulter once mass
default has been proven; and it should be less stringently applied when evidence is
adduced that the defaulter lacked reasonable access to information about the nature
and extent of the risk of loss. See generally Matthew Horn, Ontai v. Straub Clinic &
Hospital: Who Carries The Burden ofProvingDesignDefects, 6 U. HAw. L. REv. 635 (1984)
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patterned instructions to juries deciding the issue."' Finally, they
can take account of the comparative market share of Ford's competitors both before and after public awareness of defects in their
products.185
None of this supposes that Ford inevitably should have given
up all conceivable its profits on account of the mass default. No
motor vehicle is perfectly safe and manufacturers continually evaluate the cost of accidents in the use of their products.1 8 6 However,
(discussing a decision by the Hawaii Supreme Court dealing with strict liability in tort,
negligence, and breach of warranty); Caryn Beck-Dudley, Shifting the Burden of Proofin
a Products Liability Case: Anderson v. Somberg, 18 IDAHO L. REv. 539 (1982) (focusing
on the policy reasons for placing the burden of proof on the defendant in products
liability actions); Jay H. Henderson, Policy and Proof: Shifting the Burden of Proof in a
Products Liability Case, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 83 (1982). Courts can also create rules to
govern discovery. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795 (1991).
184 See, Council of Superior Court Judges of Georgia, Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil Cases, 91 (1980); Committee on StandardJury Instructions, Civil, of
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, California Jury Instructions,
§ 14.71 (6th ed. 1977 & Supp. 1981); Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil § 35.01
(2d ed. 1973) in KENNETH REDDEN, PUNrrIvE DAMAGES Appendix A, § 1.4(E) (1980);
Wisconsin Jury Instructions: Civil - Part III, § 1707 (1962) in REDDEN, supra,Appendix
A, § 1.4(). On the value or otherwise of jury trials in mass civil litigation, see generally Joseph M. Hassett, A Jury's Pre-TrialKnowledge in HistoricalPerspective: The Distinction Between Pre-TrialInformation and Prejudicial"Publicity, 43 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
155 (1980); Thomas M. Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to July Trial of Antitrust
Issues, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1981); Morris S. Arnold, A HistoricalInquiy Into the Right to
Trial byJuty in Complex Civil Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 829 (1980); Patrick Devlin,
Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80
COLUM. L. REv. 43 (1980); David J. Edquist, The Use ofJuries in Complex Cases, 3 CORP.
L. REv. 277 (1980); Note, The Right to aJury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation,92 HI-tv.
L. REv. 898 (1979); Note, Preserving the Right to Jury Trial in Complex Civil Cases, 32
STAN. L. REv. 99 (1979); Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 114
N.Y.S.2d 401, 404 (App. Div. 1952) (per Mr. Justice Bergan). But see Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353, 364 (N.D. Ala. 1984); James L.
Flannery, Note, Complex Civil Litigation: Reconciling the Demands of Due Process with the
Right to Trialby Jury, 42 U. PIr. L. REv. 693 (1981); Annot., 54 A.L.R. Fed. 733 (1981);
School City of E. Chicago, Indiana v. East Chicago Fed'n of Teachers, 422 N.E. 2d 656
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981); Edward T. O'Donnell, Design Litigation and Strict Liability: The
Problem of Jury Instructions Which Do Not Instruct, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 1051 (1979).
185 The court can also determine the defendant's profits or savings from its sales
record. For example, Ford's profits could reasonably have been calculated in light of
Ford's actual and projected car sales and the impact which the Pinto dispute had
upon those sales. On comparable cases involving, among others, the General Motors
Corporation, see supra notes 42-44 and 171.
186 This assertion, that accidents have costs which cannot be avoided, is well evidenced in the literature. See, e.g., GuIDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). While it is difficult to imagine producers developing hazard-free goods and services, it is equally difficult to accept Owen's proposition that death was economically justified in the Ford Pinto litigation because
"feasible technology simply does not exist to reduce many such collision risks." Owen,
supra note 5, at 30. The fact is that Ford Motor Company foresaw the probability of
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the Grimshaw case identifies situations in which mass defaulters
ought not to profit from known and dangerous risks that cause
indeterminate harm to a mass of victims. Such damages remain
compensatory; their purpose is to deter mass default, not ruin the
defaulter. The goal is to arrive at a coherent measure of damages,
rather than an arbitrary determination, as occurs with punitive
87
damage awards. 1
B.

DisgorgingMass Savings

A defaulter also hordes savings when it fails to compensate
mass consumers for their property losses. The dispute involving
the Wells Fargo Bank best reveals the method of disgorging such
savings."' 8 The aim here is twofold: to determine the extent of
Wells Fargo's savings arising from mass default, and to establish a
formula for disgorging those savings.
Expressed as a formula, the Wells Fargo Bank gained unfairly
when the sum of its savings arising from mass default exceeded the
sum of its costs in defending actions against it, as well as the damages it had to pay successful customers." 9 Wells Fargo could have
saved by forcing each customer's costs of suit to increase, thereby
inhibiting each customer from proceeding against it and enabling
it to settle for less than full compensation.1 9 0 For example, it could
have delayed proceedings by resorting to lengthy discovery procedures, requests for summary judgment, persistent interlocutory
real and substantial harm arising from the use of the Pinto and did not try to warn
about or avert such risks in the interest of profit-making. However frequently corporations make economic decisions at the expense of human life, that fact does not
render those decisions either morally praise-worthy or legally defensible. But see Symposium, The Passage of Time: The Implicationsfor Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734
(1983).
187 This need to deter personal injury through civil action is echoed in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (Cal. 1962). However, such deterrence is accomplished wholly through punitive damages. As the court stated in Greenman, "[t]he purpose of [punitive] liability is to ensure that the costs of injuries
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves." Id. On punitive damages, see supra note 155.
188 See supra note 16.
189

Let

G
SB

=

Unfair Gains
Savings from Breach

CD = Cost of Defending
D = Damages Paid

Actions

Gu occurs when -> S, > (CD + D).
190 The defendant can cause the costs of plaintiffs to increase selectively. For example, it can cause an increase in the costs of plaintiffs who are likely to capitulate on
account of those costs. It can refrain from increasing the costs of other plaintiffs
whom it is willing to compensate in full.
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motions, and successive appeals.1 9 ' It could thereby have insulated
itself from liability by ensuring that each customer's costs of suit
192
exceeded its benefit to them.
Wells Fargo could also have discouraged private claims against
it by erecting civil barriers to liability. For example, it could have
insulated itself from liability by assigning selected rights and duties
in dispute to its subsidiaries within a complex corporate infrastructure. 93 It also could have argued against unravelling interlocking
corporate relationships on grounds that this would undermine
public confidence in, among other institutions, the banking
system.'"

Finally, Wells Fargo could have dissuaded customers from suing it en masse by selectively improving upon its performance. For
example, it could have performed fully in respect of some customers, partially in relation to others, and not at all in respect of yet
others. 9 5 More subtly, it could have settled the claims of aggressive customers and ignored or denied the claims of others. In each
case, it could have reduced its savings by the extent to which it
improved upon the quality of its performance. However, in compensating only some customers for
their losses, it would have
19 6
others.
to
paid
not
horded savings
191 Protracting litigation is a well used tactic when the defendant wishes to evaluate
the extent to which the plaintiff has shallow pockets, and once having done so, threatens to empty them by raising the cost of suit prior to the exhaustion of plaintiff's legal
remedies. The defendant's ultimate aim is nonpayment of the claim or at least settlement for a lesser amount than the amount claimed. See J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcriCE, § 23.01 (2d ed. 1982); ARTHUR R. MILLER, AN OVERVIEW
OF FEDERAL CLAss ACTIONS: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE (1977); Punitive Damages in
Mass Tort Cases: Recovery on Behalf of a Class, 15 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 397, 410-13 (1984);
Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation - Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D.
199 (1976); Landers & Vance, supra note 62; State Class Action Statutes: A Comparative
Analysis, supra note 62.
192 The higher each customer's costs of suit, Cs, the less likely is that customer to
sue. The likely result is that each customer will refrain from suing when Cs > Wi Di,
where Wi is the i plaintiffs chance of winning and Di is the amount of damages that
the i plaintiff is likely to recover from suit.
193 See supra note 15.
194 Public exposure doubtless will reveal that other banks employ similar practices.
Public regulators are likely to be reluctant to crack down on banks publicly, for fear of
disturbing their image as bastions of the public's trust. In addition, a generally deferential public is generally disinclined to view bank default as a deliberate or reckless
course of conduct.
195 Most customers of banks likely lack the financial, legal and social resources to
sue it for breach of contract. Most also assume that banks generally can unbalance
their foes, or alternatively, buy them off with privileged treatment, such as improved
interest rates, extended lines of credit, and the like. See supra note 190.
196 In so doing, the defendant would effectively reduce the total number of parties
who are able or entitled to bring suit for compensation to a lesser number of plain-
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The Class of Complainants

Courts that disgorge savings or profits arising out of mass default are constrained in two respects: first, by the need to allocate
savings or profits among deserving claimants, and second, by the
responsibility to determine the manner in which a public interest
trust disburses the residue. As both functions are in the interest of
class members and the public at large, each is dealt with below.
1. Deserving Claimants
Only deserving plaintiffs who have suffered an identifiable loss
or injury for which they have received inadequate or no compensation should share in the savings or profits arising from mass default. 197 Deserving plaintiffs, in disputes like Wells Fargo, are best
identified in apposition to claimants who are undeserving. Undeserving claimants include those whose claims are adventitious or
are otherwise speculative. Applied to the Wells Fargo illustration,
claims are adventitious when claimants are aware of the bank's illicit surcharges, but fail to question them, and when they do so ex
post in the belief that they now can embarrass the bank into giving
them a favorable settlement 9 8 Claims are also adventitious when
tiffs. As a result, it would further increase its savings earned from mass default. See
supra text accompanying notes 178-82.
197 This real and substantial harm test is often reflected in the judicial requirement
that the "actual" damages must be established before restitution will be awarded. This
requirement parallels those cases in which the plaintiff must establish real and substantial harm in order to receive non-pecuniary damages. See, e.g., Seasons Coal Co. v.
City of Cleveland, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (Ohio 1984); Welch v. Cooper, 670 S.W.2d 454
(Ark. Ct. App. 1984); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 678 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Kimmey v. Peek, 678 P.2d 1021 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Morrill v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,
564 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Purcell Co. v. Spriggs Enterprises, Inc., 431 So. 2d
515 (Ala. 1983); Winkle v. Grand Nat'l Bank, 601 S.W.2d 559, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 880
(1980); Skipper v. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 334 So. 2d 863 (Ala. 1976); Belleville v.
Davis, 498 P.2d 744 (1972); Crouter v. United Adjusters, Inc., 485 P.2d 1208 (Ore.
1971); Carnation Lumber Co. v. McKenney, 356 P.2d 932 (Or. 1960); Richard v.
Hunter, 85 N.E.2d 109 (Ohio 1949). The defaulter may be entitled to retain savings,
Si, when the risk of opportunistic claims is significant and requiring such payment
would likely increase rather than reduce social costs.
198 For cases in which the risk of default was "obvious" to claimants, or the subject
of "widespread knowledge" prior to the mass loss, see Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594
P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979), on rehearing, 615 P.2d 621 (1980), cert. denied 454 U.S. 894
(1981) (plaintiff "obviously" knew of risk when he dropped a loaded gun and was shot
in the knee); Hegwood v. General Motors Corp., 286 N.W.2d 29, 30 (Iowa 1979)
(plaintiff bore responsibility for tire blowout that occurred while driving at 110-120
m.p.h.). See alsoTurney v. Ford Motor Co., 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1087 (Ill. 1981); Sabich
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 131 Cal. Rptr. 703, 706 (Ct. App. 1976). But cf Gryc v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn.), cert. denied sub nom. Riegel Textile
Corp. v. Gryc, 449 U.S. 921 (1980); Wussow v. Commercial Mechanisms, Inc., 293
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plaintiffs are contributorily at fault. For example, they are aware
of, or partly responsible for, defects in the defendant's performance, but fail to remedy or otherwise mitigate the ensuing losses.
A deserving claimant needs to establish an identifiable loss.
Loss can include a loss of life, health, and income in personal injury cases like Grimshaw, or a loss of salary, sick days, or severance
pay in employment cases. It can also cover excessive premiums, or
a refusal to pay a legitimate claim in insurance cases. Finally, in the
Wells Fargo Bank illustration, the identifiable loss can refer to a
surcharge, or other penalty extracted from customers en masse, in
breach of contract. 199
Plaintiffs who are deserving and who suffer an identifiable loss
ought to share in mass costs and savings proportionate to the ex20 0
tent of their losses. While equal sharing is sometimes necessary,
pro rata sharing of litigation costs and mass damages is preferable
because it impedes free riding on that class by preventing claimants with proportionately less loss from sharing equally with other
class members. Deserving claimants are entitled to share pro rata
under these specific conditions: they sustain different degrees of
loss which they are reasonably able to establish; their interests are
comparable to the interests of other claimants; and the cost of pro
rata sharing is not prohibitive or inequitable to other class members. For example, had some claimants sustained more significant
losses than others in the Wells Fargo dispute, but received equal
shares with those others, they would have been prejudiced had
they been forced to join a mandatory class. Similarly, had those
other claimants sustained limited losses, they would have been disadvantaged had they been required to pay an equal share of litiga-

N.W.2d 897 (Wis. 1980). See also David E. Gardels, Note, Overuse in Products Liability,
57 NEB. L. REV. 817, 833 (1978); Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of
Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 153, 163 (1976); David G. Owen, The Highly Blameworthy
Manufacturer- Implications on Rules of Liability and Defense in Poducts Liability Actions, 10
IND. L.J. 769, 777-87 (1977). But see G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the
Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Towards a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REv. 221
(1991).
199 Using the Wells Fargo Illustration, each claimant is required to identify his or
her loss at the time of filing the claim so that it reasonably be verified. Identifying the
size of a claim ordinarily occurs when customers of banks who are surcharged for
checks returned for insufficient funds verify the number of checks involved through
personal, or failing that, bank records.
200 Equal sharing in the distribution of a mass award is applied in mass consumer
cases when plaintiff losses are roughly comparable, when requiring each plaintiff to
prove the precise extent of a loss is unduly costly, and when equal payment to each is
equitable. On such equal payment, see supra note 132.'
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tion costs of the class.2 0 1
2.

Other Claimants

Deserving claimants are identified when they file their claims,
asserting that they have suffered an identifiable loss on account of
the defendant's default and that they have the right to benefit
from the award as class members. Ordinarily, such claimants are
restricted to those to whom a defendant like Wells Fargo Bank has
assumed a contractual or other legal obligation and who join the
class at the outset. However, three further categories of claimants
are reasonably entitled to share in the mass award: subsequent
claimants, incidental claimants, and public interest organizations
who are justified in sharing in surplus funds. These three categories are discussed below.
3.

Subsequent Claimants

By definition, all persons who are subject to mass default, who
suffer loss or harm as a result of it, and who do not receive adequate compensation are justified in sharing in savings and profits
arising out of mass default. 2 ' Included within this group are persons who sustain a direct loss because of mass default, but who do
not participate in the mass claim at the time it is filed. Such subsequent claimants typically include those who are unaware of, or are
unable to prove, their losses at the time of suit, or who cannot afford to join the class at the outset. This occurs, in the Wells Fargo
illustration, when customers are unaware of the bank's default,
when they have not retained records of such default, and when
they lack resources to join the class action when it is instituted.
Subsequent claimants ordinarily are justified in sharing in the mass
award when they suffer loss or harm in consequence of the default.
See supra note 130.
A distinction can readily be drawn between those who do not seek, by reason of
intimidation or lack of resources, pro rata shares and those who decide not to because
of disinterest or a belief that the defendant's prior conduct was not wrongful. However, in principle, it would be inappropriate for the court or tribunal to exclude the
201
202

latter class out of hand. First, they did sustain a loss. Second,judges and arbitrators
can speculate about their motive erroneously. Third, non-claimants may have been
"conned" into believing in a defendant's virtue. Finally, why should non-claimants
not change their minds and seek recompensation? They would still be required to
contribute to the costs of suit after-the-fact. The downside to this approach is that
parties may be encouraged to do nothing, allowing others to sue on their behalf, with
the intention of sharing in the fruits of successful litigation. To remedy this problem,

non-claimants are appropriately subject to an administrative charge for the cost of the
suit, not charged plaintiffs who join in the suit at the outset.
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They are also worthy members of the class when they help to fund
it, when they would be denied a remedy were they excluded from
20 3
it, and when they promote its credibility by enlarging it.
Courts can discourage subsequent claimants from free riding
on a class action or from not joining it until its success appears to
be assured. For example, they can require class members to pay a
premium to offset the costs of suit and/or permit subsequent
claimants to share in the surplus only after first order claims have
been satisfied.20 4
4.

Incidental Claimants

Incidental claimants are those who provide benefits to parties
who are subject to mass default and who incur costs or suffer losses
as a result of providing those benefits. Authorities that subsidize
the mortgages of customers in consequence of mortgage
surcharges by a bank are incidental claimants to the extent of that
subsidization. Hospitals that provide services to patients without
charge, or at a reduced rate, in consequence of mass default, are
incidental claimants. Family members who provide loans or other
20
services to victims of mass default are also incidental claimants. 1
Despite the incidental benefit rule, 20 6 prospective public harm
arising from mass default reasonably justifies incidental claims.20 7
On the mandatory class action, see supra § IV.
While these requirements can adversely impact upon the "right" of subsequent
claimants to join the class, it is necessary to discourage them from sitting on the sidelines, waiting to see if the class is likely to win the action before joining it. See infra
notes 215-16.
205 The incidental beneficiary is readily identified, by analogy, in tort litigation involving the hormonal drug DES (diethylstilbestrol). In increasing the likelihood of
causing cancer in the offspring of pregnant women ingesting DES, the cost of illness
necessarily extended to persons beyond the pregnant women ingesting it. For example, that cost inevitably was borne by the family, friends and public organizations who
cared for, or otherwise supported infected victims. In addition, that cost likely increased over time with the spiralling growth of medical and related treatment costs.
See generally Kathleen M. Brahn, Note, Diethylstilbestrol. Extension of Federal Class Action
Procedures to Generic Drug Litigation, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 461 (1980) (describing the challenges posed by the DES litigation and proposing a solution based upon the use of a
class action).
206 As applied in contract law, the rule regarding incidental beneficiaries, excludes
claims by third parties, that is, those who are not parties to a contract, from claiming a
benefit under the contract. See, e.g., Shubitz v. Consolidated Edison Co., 301 N.Y.S.2d
926 (Sup. Ct. 1969). However, the incidental benefit rule, a byproduct of classical
contract law governing privity, is no longer stringently applied in contracts. In particular, incidental beneficiaries are entitled to satisfaction of their claims on grounds of,
among others, the protection of their reliance interests. See generally FARNSWORTH,
supra note 30, § 10.3, at 756.
207 For attempts by judges to bypass the formal division between contract relations
203
204
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First, public and private interest organizations sometimes subsidize
victims of mass default. For example, consumer agencies or charitable organizations subsidize multiple victims of mass default. Second, such subsidization reduces private or public interest funds
that would otherwise have been available for other purposes. For
example, public housing authorities that subsidize consumers who
are unjustifiably surcharged on their mortgages have proportionately less funds available to finance alternative housing projects.20°
As indicated above, incidental claimants ordinarily ought to
receive compensation only after the first order claims of immediate
and subsequent claimants have been satisfied, and only if there is a
surplus. This surplus occurs, for example, in the Wells Fargo illustration, when immediate or subsequent customers of the Bank cannot be located or are unwilling to join the class or otherwise share
in the award. Incidental claimants are not entitled to mass damages when their losses are not reasonably attributable to mass default, when compensating them duplicates the award to immediate
or subsequent claimants, or when damages exceed the defendant's
mass savings or profits. For example, a public interest authority
that subsidizes the surcharged customer of a bank like Wells Fargo
has no claim on the surplus when the bank has already recom20 9
pensed that customer for that same loss.
The award of damages to parties with whom the defaulter did
not contract directly is not punitive. A defaulter like Wells Fargo
Bank still sacrifices no more than its total savings or profit arising
from failing adequately to compensate mass victims. In addition, it
ordinarily has no justifiable right to any surplus itself, given that it
breached wrongfully and en masse. 1
on the basis of privity of contract, see In re General Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 330
(E.D. Pa. 1993).
208 See supra note 141.
209 See supra note 16.
210 No doubt, there will be both formal and substantive objections to allowing nonimmediate parties to claim for their losses. First, they are not direct parties to the
specific contract in respect of which recompensation is being sought. Second, their
claims are too remote from losses ordinarily awarded in contract. These objections,
however, are surmountable. In particular, it is inappropriate to overstate their disinterest in the well-being of those whom they support as a result of mass default. Nor
is it justifiable for the mass defaulting party to avoid responsibility for the consequences of its actions, particularly when third parties support those whom the defaulter, knowingly, has left destitute. Indeed, these claims resemble, at least in
principle, the "special damages" that are identified in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341,
156 All E.R. 145 (1854). Finally, the assertion that non-immediate claimants should
be disentitled to claim because they are not parties to the contract overstates the
formal character of privity and consideration. Privity in the contract, as distinct from
privity between the parties, surely encompasses those who act in terms of it, including
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Finally, the award to incidental claimants is principled: the
legal system ought to compensate parties who suffer a loss on account of mass default and deter the defaulter from mass default.
These dual ends are private; they promote an equitable remedy
between the defendant and the specific victims of its default, including incidental claimants. They are also public; they disperse
the undistributed surplus to consumers at large in the social
interest.
D. Distribution of Primary Funds
Under a scheme of proportionate liability, plaintiffs share pro
rata in the award until the payments fully recompense all deserving
plaintiffs or exhaust the defendant's limited fund.2 1 ' Pro rata sharing is justified because it ensures that no class member is under- or
over-compensated vis d vis other class members. In addition, it
promotes greater involvement in the action by claimants with a
greater interest in the award and reduces ex post conflict among
them over their respective shares of it.2 12
The disbursement of damages to plaintiffs ordinarily is justified at two stages: during the course of litigation and when the
award is rendered. The first pro rata payment is warranted when
claimants have incurred ongoing costs in bringing suit, when protracted litigation is likely, when the defendant has paid part damages into court, and when the absence of part payment would
dissuade claimants from proceeding further. The second pro rata
payment is justified when the court has established: the full size of
the class, the quantum of damages, and a formula by which to
share those damages among class members. These damages are
disbursed pro rata to all deserving plaintiffs.2" 3 Applied to the
Wells Fargo dispute, the overall goal is to ensure that no deserving
those who support the destitute victims of mass default. See, e.g., La Mourea v. Rhude,
295 N.W. 304 (Minn. 1940); see also supra note 206.
211 On such pro rata sharing in the award, see supra note 131.
212 Arguments against the pro rata allocation of damages are several: pro rata
losses are difficult and costly to determine; claimants are not always justified in receiving pro rata payment; and pro rata payment to all claimants somehow would cripple
the defendant. For courts that reject the requirement of proportionality in relation
to losses in civil suit, see, e.g., Moore v. American United Life Ins. Co., 197 Cal. Rptr.
878, 895 (Ct. App. 1984); Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d430, 436 (Fla. 1978);
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 630-31 (Tex. 1967).
213 Plaintiffs who receive the first pro rata payment are justified in receiving a reduced second pro rata payment when both payments would over-compensate them
for their losses. This reduction is warranted when the first pro rata payment exceeds
the costs incurred by those plaintiffs compared to the costs incurred by other plaintiffs who do not receive that first payment.
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claimant contributes proportionately more or less to the costs of
suit against the Bank, or receives proportionately more or less of
the total disbursement paid to claimants.
No perfect formula exists by which a court or tribunal can determine the amount of the first pro rata payment to make to deserving plaintiffs. As a general rule, the payment should suffice to
ensure the ongoing involvement of the class action. However, it
should not be so vast as to impede pro rata disbursement to other
deserving plaintiffs who subsequently join the class.2 14
E. Distribution of Surplus Funds
In the event that some savings arising from not compensating
or under-compensating victims of mass default remain undisbursed
after compensating both non- and incidental claimants, that residuary is held in a trust fund for three purposes. First, the trust can
apportion the residue among prospective claimants who are unaware of, or unable to prove their losses at the time of suit, 2 15 but
who subsequently become aware of, or are able to prove, them.2 16
See generally infra note 216.
Correspondingly, such non-claimants would be required to participate in the
costs of suit and therefore, would be assessed, retroactively, to cover their proportionate share of the same.
216 Decision-makers need to determine both the size of the trust and the amount to
allocate to each claimant. For example, judges need to establish whether the trust
fund should consist of $1 million, and whether each claimant should receive $100,
$50, or some other amount. However, they cannot know with certainty at the outset
the total number of claimants; and it follows that they cannot know the amount to
award each claimants until they determine that total number. Should they estimate
10,000 claimants seeking shares in a $1 million award, each claimant would be entitled to $100. Should they estimate 20,000 claimants, each would be entitled to only
$50. Their problem is to anticipate ex ante the number of prospective claimants so as
to avoid either exhausting the trust prematurely, or ending up with a surplus. For
example, should they estimate that the number of claimants is 10,000 and award each
claimant $100, they will exhaust the fund prematurely should the actual number of
claimants be 20,000. Conversely, they will be left with a surplus should they estimate
20,000 claimants, pay each $50, and then be faced with only 10,000 claims.
There is no instant solution to these problems. As was indicated above, courts
can estimate the total number of claimants in light of historical experience. For example, they can reasonably anticipate few claims when the amount allocated to each
claim is small, when the class action is not well publicized, when the claims process is
complicated, and when potential claimants are uneducated. They can assume, too,
that prospective claimants have little incentive to claim when they anticipate receiving
a trivial amount, when claims forms are complex, and when prospective claimants
anticipate the rejection of their claims on ground that they are not completed in full.
In addition, claims are likely to be fewer when existing claimants discourage claims,
for example, by declining to publicize the trust or claims process, in the interests of
increasing their own share of it. However, despite these historical facts, the number
of claims remains an estimate only.
214

215
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Second, the trust can use the residue to offset the ongoing administration costs of the fund, including the cost of managing and disbursing unallocated moneys.2 17 Third, the trust can disburse any
residue among public interest organizations in the interest of consumers in general. Applied to the Wells Fargo illustration, the trust
residue can be used for the benefit of a banking public in the com2 18
mon interest.
This disbursement of surplus funds is ordinarily accomplished
Courts have several possible ways of solidifying these estimates. They can determine the amount to pay each claimant only after all claims are filed. However, it can
take years before all claims are filed: claimants need to be identified, claimants require the chance to file their claims, and claims need to be processed. To deny all
payments until every claimant is identified is also to trivialize both claimants' losses
and the need to deter default. It is also likely to add to the costs of supervising and
administering the claims process. More simply, courts can pay an estimated less-thanfull-compensation ex ante, increasing that amount ex post in light of more accurate
information subsequently received about the class size. For example, they can pay
claimants an estimated $50 initially, assuming that the number of claimants in the
above example are 20,000. They can pay such claimants a further $50 after all claims
are filed and on discovering that total claimants number only 10,000. This method is
likely to satisfy the immediate demands of claimants, at least in part, and avoid leaving
a surplus in the trust. However, it is also likely to raise administration costs in requiring claims to be processed twice, once ex ante and again, ex post. Another possible way
of estimating is to leave a surplus in the trust and thereafter disburse that surplus to a
public interest organization. This is the method adopted here. See infra note 225.
Again, the estimated number of claimants may be incorrect. In addition, leaving the
surplus in a public interest organization may be unfair to claimants, since each will
receive less by the extent of that surplus. In addition, leaving the surplus to a public
interest organization means rewarding a class of persons beyond the victims
themselves.
These alternative methods of disbursing funds all have some currency in practice.
For example, the court in Ohio Public Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, 546 F.
Supp. 1, 7 (D.C. Ohio 1982), estimated the number of claimant householders in an
affected geographic area who were subject to mass abuse: it mailed $20s worth of
grocery coupons to each of them and paid the residue to a trust fund directed at
buying food for the needy. Finally, it increased the trust fund by the amount of unredeemed grocery coupons. Id. This method ensured, inter alia, that prospective
claimants had the opportunity to make a claim and also provided a method of disbursing the residue to a determinative class of persons. While all claimants received
less than that which they would have received had there been no surplus, the surplus
was used for a worthy consumer end. On a consumer class action in which claimants
exhausted the surplus fund, see In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotics
Antitrust Actions, 410 F. Supp. 659 (D. Minn. 1974). However, even there, the total
number of claimants were less than one million, while the class included 12 million.
On the estimation of consumer class awards, see generally Kerry Barnett, Note, Equitable Trusts: An Effective Remedy in Consumer Class Actions, 96 YALE L.J. 1591, 1600
(1987); Natalie A. Dejarlais, Note, The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 729, 755 (1987).
217 These costs include, inter alia, the costs of appointing special officers to hear,
investigate, and award claims, the costs of administering the trust itself, and ancillary
expenses associated with maintaining it.
218 On the cy pres trust, see infra notes 220-24.
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through a cy pres trust, administered by a board of directors or
trustees. 19 The trust distributes funds in three stages: it places residuary funds recovered by suit or settlement into escrow; it notifies
beneficiaries under the trust of its existence, of their entitlements
under it, and of the manner in which they should file their claims;
and it distributes the trust to them as directed by the cy pres
220
instrument.
As stated above, the trust can be used to disburse funds to
claimants who are not reasonably aware of their losses at the time
of the damage award. This occurs, in cases like Wells Fargo, when
customers of the bank are widely dispersed geographically, when
the class action is not extensively advertised in their region, and
when their claims against the bank are valid. The trust can also be
used to offset the administrative costs of suit. For example, it can
pay costs incurred in appointing a special master to hear, investigate, and award claims. It can offset the cost of maintaining the
trust. It can also subsidize expenses incurred in scrutinizing the
activities of public interest organizations charged with administer22 1
ing the trust.
Finally, the trust can be given to a public interest organization
for a specific purpose. For example, the trust can help to educate
consumers about their legal rights, 2 22 by establishing consumer
224
complaint centers, 22 ' by providing advocacy skills to consumers,
or by extending services to consumers in general. 225 This disburse219 On the appointment of a special master in mass disaster cases, see, e.g., Feinberg, supra note 67, at 101-02. For a strong endorsement of such an appointment in
"big cases," see Irving R. Kaufman, Use of Special Pre-TrialMasters in the "Big" Case in
Proceedings of the Seminar on ProtractedCases, 23 F.R.D. 572 (1959); Irving R. Kaufman,
Masters in the Federal Courts: Rule 23, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 465-68 (1958). See also
David Rosenberg, Comment, Of End Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons
from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REv. 695 (1989).
220 On resort to the cy pres and other categories of equitable trust in consumer class
actions, see Gail Hillebrand & Daniel Torrence, Claims Procedures in Large Consumer
Class Actions and Equitable Distribution of Benefits, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747 (1988);
Barnett, supra note 216.
221 See supra note 142.
222 See, e.g., In re the Application of Pacific Bell, No. 87-12-067 (Dec. 22, 1987) (Application 85-01-034; 1.85-03-078; 01184; C.86-11-028); Stern v. U.S. Sprint, No. 000933
(L.A. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 10, 1986); Vasquez v. Arco Financial Services, No.
NCC119338 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed May 9, 1984); Sturdevant v. Hibernia Bank, No.
814105 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Oct. 10, 1986).
223 See, e.g., Stern v. U.S. Sprint, No. 000933 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 4, 1988).
224 See, e.g., Vasquez v. Arco Financial Services, No. NCC119338 (L.A. Super. Ct.
filed May 9, 1984); Sturdevant v. Hibernia Bank, No. 814105 (S.F. Super. Ct. filed Oct.
10, 1986).
225 Most often, a cy pres trust does use moneys, secured through judgement or settlement of a consumer class action, to educate, aid, or otherwise service consumers, not
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ment of trust moneys can be accomplished imaginatively. For example, the court can mandate a bank like Wells Fargo to provide
customers with a kit explaining how to conduct banking transactions. 22 6 The court can order a company that deals primarily with
consumers to establish fellowships for academic work on consumer
protection.2 2 7
VII.

CONCLUSION

The private litigation model has failed to redress the interests
of mass consumers. Too costly to mount and unduly slow to unfold, it has reduced the average consumer to the compliant prey of
big business. Preoccupied with the autonomy of individual litigants, many courts have steadfastly refused to modify the private
litigation model to protect consumers from such mass abuse. They
have ignored the inability of most consumers to mount an effective
individual suit against big business, allowing banks, insurance companies and auto manufacturers, among others, to profit from the
litigious inaction of a consuming public.
The alternative is to develop a more socially responsible
method of redressing the public harm that mass default of consumer transactions causes. Enabling consumers to proceed in unison against big business accomplishes this desire. The goal is to
provide consumers with a communal free choice that is effective
and fair, in place of an individual free choice that is neither. As
one judge with weighty experience in mass litigation recently
declared:
Our legal system highly values individual interests and prerogatives. But just as individualism run riot can be damaging in so228
cial matters, so too may it need checking in mass litigations.
This article has sought two primary ends: to deter such mass
default in consumer transactions; and to compensate both private
and public victims of such default. These ends are accomplished
limited to the default in issue. On the history and development of the cy pres remedy
in the law of charitable trusts, see, e.g., In re Estate of Gatlin, 94 Cal. Rptr. 295, 296
(1971); GEORGE BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUST AND TRUSTEES, §§ 431-42 (Rev. 2d ed.

1977); NEWBERG, supra note 20, § 11; Barnett, supra note 216, at 1595-96; DeJarlais,
supra note 216.

226 Considering the potential size of a damage award, the defendant's saving in
being able to perform part of its obligations in an instructive manner in the future
can be significant. In addition, the defendant likely gains goodwill in demonstrating
to its customers its willingness to improve the quality of its performance in relation to

them.
227
228

See Stern v. U.S. Sprint, No. 000933 (L.A. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 4, 1988).
Weinstein, supra note 4, at 485.
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by resort to two seldom used institutions: a mandatory class action,
and a public interest trust. A mandatory class action allows a mass
of consumers to sue a defaulter in an organized and equitable
manner; it also avoids forcing a mass defaulter to incur huge costs
in defending multiple private actions. A private interest trust ensures that any surplus remaining after compensating mass claimants benefits classes of consumers that otherwise might be
victimized by mass default in the future. These two institutions,
not restricted to consumer groups, aim to protect mass victims
from recurrent breach by an otherwise dominant defaulter. The
design is to eliminate replicated suit, to compensate a mass of
plaintiffs with comparable causes of action, and to deter like default in the public interest.

